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We analyze a dynamic principal–agent model where an inﬁnitely–lived principal faces a
sequence of ﬁnitely–lived agents who diﬀer in their ability to produce output. The ability of an
agent is initially unknown to both him and the principal. An agent’s eﬀort aﬀects the information
on ability that is conveyed by performance. We characterize the equilibrium contracts and
show that they display short–term commitment to employment when the impact of eﬀort on
output is persistent but delayed. By providing insurance against early termination, commitment
encourages agents to exert eﬀort, and thus improves on the principal’s ability to identify their
talent. We argue that this helps explain the use of probationary appointments in environments
in which there exists uncertainty about individual ability.
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11 Introduction
It has long been recognized that skilled individuals can only be identiﬁed through careful selection.
Given the well–known diﬃculty to identify talent, ﬁrms usually employ a range of methods to
evaluate job candidates.1 Standard practices include the review of resumes, the evaluation of
references, various forms of testing, and interviewing. As part of their hiring process, many ﬁrms
also rely on probationary appointments—temporary contracts that promise employment for a pre–
speciﬁed period of time—to determine whether new workers are suited to handle the duties and
challenges associated with their jobs.2
The use of probation is common to many occupations and professions, including management
consulting, the legal profession, and academia. It is generally agreed that in these latter instances
a worker’s output critically depends on his skill, but the qualities that distinguish a successful
individual are typically only revealed through time. Why then should an employer commit to
retain a worker of uncertain talent for a certain period of time rather than decide on employment
as the relationship unfolds? Intuitively, if performance on the job provides information about talent,
and thus is a signal of future productivity, the ﬂexibility to replace workers whose performance is
unsatisfactory should always be valuable to a ﬁrm. In this paper we show, on the contrary, that
when the talent of new hires is uncertain, an employer might beneﬁt from restricting its ability to
dismiss workers early in their careers. The reason is that such commitment can induce workers to
invest in generating information about their ability and thus help a ﬁrm identify their talent.
Indeed, a ﬁrm cannot beneﬁt from oﬀering probation when a worker’s talent is uncertain, but
the extent to which performance reveals ability is independent of his dedication to his job. In this
1The following quote, which discusses the limitations of behavioral interviews, illustrates this point: “Despite their
advantages, behavioral interviews really only establish a candidate’s minimum qualiﬁcations; they don’t identify star
talent. A candidate’s experience, for example, is obviously an important hiring factor, but we all know seasoned
executives who aren’t stars. Similarly, being likable doesn’t mean you have the intellectual horsepower to be a stellar
leader. (...) Knowledge is information acquired through experience or formal training. Intelligence is the skill with
which someone uses knowledge to solve a problem.” [Justin Menkes, managing director of the Executive Intelligence
Group, a New York–based consulting ﬁrm focused on the assessment of executive talent, as quoted in “Hiring for
Smart”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 83, No. 11, November 2005.]
2The terminology is not uniform. Probationary periods are also understood as the stage at the beginning of an
employment relationship during which an employer has greater discretion to dismiss workers. This is common in
unionized industries and is not the object of our study.
2case, the only eﬀect of commitment to employment is to prevent the ﬁrm from dismissing a worker
once he is perceived to be ill–suited to his job. In many instances, however, not only performance
conveys information about ability, but the precision of this information is directly aﬀected by a
worker’s eﬀort on the job. For instance, whether a restructuring project is successful in addressing
the needs of a client ﬁrm depends both on the talent of the consultants involved and on their
commitment. Likewise, a talented lawyer is more likely to develop a successful legal strategy for
a client if he is fully engaged in his work. In all of these circumstances, the prospect of an early
dismissal might discourage a worker from dedicating himself to his job despite the fact that exerting
eﬀort helps reveal talent. Oﬀering probation may then be valuable to a ﬁrm if insurance against
early failure stimulates workers to produce informative signals about their ability.
In order to analyze the tradeoﬀs involved in the use of probation, we consider a labor market
where an inﬁnitely–lived ﬁrm faces a constant inﬂow of ﬁnitely–lived workers. At any date, the ﬁrm
can employ at most one worker.3 We model probation as a short–term commitment to employment.
Workers diﬀer in their ability to produce output and the talent of a worker is initially unknown
to both him and the ﬁrm. The performance of an employed worker also depends on his choice of
eﬀort. We assume that eﬀort increases the probability of good performance only if the worker is
talented. Thus, eﬀort makes a worker’s output more informative about his ability.
Every worker in the market has available an outside option whose value increases with his
reputation, which we model as the ﬁrm’s belief that the worker is of high ability. Then, workers of
higher reputation are perceived as more productive, but can only be employed at a higher wage.
The value of a worker nevertheless increases with his reputation. As a consequence, the ﬁrm faces
an opportunity cost by retaining a worker whose initial performance is poor: such a worker is less
likely to be talented than a worker who is new to the market.
In the paper we identify circumstances under which probation is beneﬁcial by contrasting two
cases distinguished by the eﬀect of eﬀort on output. In the ﬁrst case, which is our benchmark, the
impact of eﬀort on output is independent and identical over time. We refer to this case as the IID
case. In the second case, eﬀort aﬀects both the current and the future performance of a worker,
3The key assumption is that the ﬁrm is capacity–constrained, and so cannot create vacancies to absorb all workers
in the market.
3but the eﬀect is mostly on the latter. In other words, eﬀort has a persistent but delayed impact on
output. We refer to the second case as the non–IID case.
In this environment, a worker who has yet to prove his talent—in particular, a worker who is
new to the market—has an incentive to exert eﬀort due to a concern for his future career. Indeed,
eﬀort makes performance more informative about ability and a worker is rewarded with a wage
increase if he proves his talent—a worker ‘invests’ in his reputation when he exerts eﬀort. The gain
to the ﬁrm if workers exert eﬀort is an improved ability to screen them. The ﬁrm then beneﬁts from
oﬀering probation to a worker who is new to the market if this strengthens his ’career concerns’
motive to exert eﬀort. This commitment, however, can be costly, for it prevents the ﬁrm from
dismissing the worker after he performs poorly.
We establish that in the IID case probation never increases, and can in fact decrease, a worker’s
reputational incentive to exert eﬀort. The ﬁrm can beneﬁt from oﬀering probation in the non–IID
case, though. The reason for this result is that in the non–IID case the incentive problem of a new
worker is compounded by the time separation of costs and returns typical of investment problems.
When the impact of eﬀort is mostly on future output, the worker can gain from investing in his
reputation only if he is guaranteed to participate in its return, that is, only if employment lasts
until the impact of eﬀort on output materializes. The ﬁrm then destroys a worker’s incentive to
exert eﬀort if it dismisses him after poor performance. As a result, the ﬁrm can gain from oﬀering
probation exactly when it would otherwise dismiss a newly hired worker who exerted eﬀort but
failed to perform well. In other words, probation can help a ﬁrm overcome its incentive to dismiss
under–performing workers and thus induce new hires to generate valuable information about their
ability. Hence, oﬀering insurance against bad performance can actually increase a worker’s incentive
to exert eﬀort.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related literature in the next section
and introduce the model in Section 3. Section 4 contains some preliminary results. We consider
the IID case in Section 5 and the non–IID case in Section 6. Section 7 shows that explicit–output
contingent contracts cannot substitute for the use of probation. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Appendix A contains all the omitted proofs and Appendix B contains omitted details.
42 Related Literature
Formally, the problem of the ﬁrm in our setting is a multi–armed bandit, the sequential sampling
problem of a decision maker who has to choose between a (ﬁnite) number of alternatives with
uncertain rewards.4 The ﬁrst application of the multi–armed bandit framework to the analysis of
employer learning in labor markets is Jovanovic (1979). Harris and Weiss (1984) and Eeckhout
(2006) extend Jovanovic’s analysis to the case where productivity is general instead of match–
speciﬁc. A fundamental diﬀerence between these papers and ours is that in our framework rewards
are endogenous: the behavior of the ﬁrm aﬀects the decisions of workers.5
A small literature considers the problem of repeated moral hazard with eﬀort persistence. Jarque
(2005) shows that this problem is observationally equivalent to a problem without persistence if the
agent’s utility is linear in eﬀort and the distribution of outcomes in a period is a function of the
discounted sum of eﬀorts. Mukoyama and S ¸ahin (2005) study a two–period problem and show
that it can be optimal for a principal to perfectly insure an agent in the ﬁrst period when eﬀort
is persistent. A few papers have also analyzed dynamic incentives in the presence of both adverse
selection and moral hazard. Laﬀont and Tirole (1988) show, in a two–period model, that short–term
contracts might not be suﬃcient to induce an informed agent to reveal his private information. More
recently, Jeitschko and Mirman (2002a), also in a two–period setting, analyze how optimal short–
term contracts trade oﬀ up–front payments for self–selection, and thus the amount of information
transmission, against the second–period informational rents to better types of agents. Banks and
Sundaram (1998) consider the problem of optimal agent–retention by a long–lived principal in the
absence of commitment when agents live for two periods.6
A related paper on contracting in the presence of uncertainty is Manso (2007), which investigates
the extent to which contracts can motivate innovation: the discovery, through experimentation and
learning, of alternatives that are better than the currently known actions. He shows, in a two–period
model, that optimal long–term wage contracts that stimulate innovation can be non–monotone in
performance, that is, they might reward early failure and late success.
4See Berry and Fristedt (1985) for an exposition of the theory of multi–armed bandits.
5The ﬁrm faces an experimentation problem with signal–dependence when eﬀort is persistent. See Datta, Mirman,
and Schlee (2002) for an analysis of such a model.
6Osband (1989) investigates the trade-oﬀ between information acquisition and incentives for eﬀort exertion when
the principal relies on an expert of unknown ability to forecast the mean of an uncertain outcome.
5Two papers that also analyze the interplay between explicit and implicit incentives in dynamic
principal–agent problems are Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Levin (2003). The ﬁrst derives
the optimal combination of explicit and implicit contracts in a model of career concerns. The
second characterizes optimal stationary self–enforcing contracts in an environment in which explicit
contracts can extend for only one period.
In our setting the nature of the relationship between the ﬁrm and a worker resembles that of two
parties in a hold–up problem (see Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) for an early reference). In
the non–IID case, despite the value of information about ability being general, workers underinvest
in their reputation unless protected by a probationary appointment. Che and Sakovics (2004)
analyze the role of contracts in a dynamic model of hold–up and provide conditions under which
trade contracts are beneﬁcial.
Equilibrium contracts in our setting have the ‘up–or–out’ feature that after probation a worker
is either permanently retained or dismissed. Kahn and Huberman (1988) and Waldman (1990) show
how up–or–out contracts that specify that an individual should be ﬁred if not promoted within some
set time can induce workers to invest in the acquisition of human capital. O’Flaherty and Siow
(1992) analyze a model of on–the–job screening and show that the optimal retention decision is an
up–or–out rule.7 Carmichael (1988) discusses how the institution of tenure can induce academic
departments to hire the best available junior researchers.8 None of these papers, however, consider
the optimality of commitment when retention involves an opportunity cost to the ﬁrm.
3 Baseline Environment
We consider a labor market with one ﬁrm and a countable number of workers. Time is discrete
and indexed by t ≥ 1.
Workers. Workers enter the market sequentially, one in each period. We assume that workers
have a strictly increasing and weakly concave Bernoulli utility function v : R+ → R; our analysis
7O’Flaherty and Siow (1995) use the model of O’Flaherty and Siow (1992) to analyze the use of up–or–out rules
in the market for lawyers.
8See also Bar–Isaac (2007), who considers the problem of selection and retention in partnerships when the contri-
bution of an individual worker cannot be inferred from the total output of the partnership.
6equally applies to risk–neutral and risk–averse workers. Workers live for T ≥ 3 periods once they
enter the market and discount future utility at a rate δw ∈ [0,1].9 Each worker can be either of
high (H) or low (L) ‘ability’. A worker’s type is unknown to both him and the ﬁrm; the probability
that a new entrant to the labor market is of high ability is φ0 ∈ (0,1).
Every period he is employed, a worker can either exert eﬀort (e), incurring a disutility cost
c > 0, or not (e), and can either produce high (y) or low (y) output. A worker’s choice of eﬀort,
which is unobservable, aﬀects his output. We consider two cases. In the ﬁrst case, our benchmark,
the output produced by each type of worker is only aﬀected by his current choice of eﬀort. In the
second case, a worker’s choice of eﬀort has an impact on both his current and future output. We
refer to the ﬁrst case as the IID case and to the second case as the non–IID case. Formally, let
e and e− denote a worker’s current and previous choice of eﬀort, respectively, where e− ≡ e for a
worker of age 1. Moreover, let Pr{y|k,e,e−} be the probability, as a function of e and e−, that a
worker of type k ∈ {L,H} produces output y ∈ {y,y}. In the IID case,
Pr{y|H,e,e−} = 1 − Pr{y|H,e,e−} = α + η(e) and Pr{y|L,e,e−} = 0
where α ∈ (0,1), η(e) = 0, and η(e) = η > 0. In the non–IID case,
Pr{y|H,e,e−} = α + η(e−,e) and Pr{y|L,e,e−} = 0
where η(e,e) ≥ η(e,e), η(e,e) ≥ η(e,e), and η(e,e) > 0.
Note that in both cases a low type worker cannot produce high output. Then, a worker who
produces high output reveals that he is talented. Put diﬀerently, a worker of high ability can prove
his talent if given enough opportunities. Also notice that in both cases a worker’s performance is
more informative about his ability when he exerts eﬀort: a worker is more likely to produce high
output when he exerts eﬀort if he is of high ability. Speciﬁcally, η(e) > η(e) in the IID case and
η(e,e) ≥ η(e,e), η(e,e) > η(e,e), and η(e,e) ≥ η(e,e) in the non–IID case.
Workers in the market have available an outside option that pays a wage wR dependent on their
reputation, where a worker’s reputation is the ﬁrm’s belief φ that he is of the high type. Since a
worker’s eﬀort choice is private, his belief about his type can diﬀer from his reputation. We assume
9The restriction that T ≥ 3 is to avoid the uninteresting case in which the decision to retain a worker for one
additional period (after his ﬁrst period of employment) amounts to permanent retention.
7that wR(1) = w and wR(φ) = wR(φ0) = w for all φ ≤ φ0. Thus, as long as a worker fails to
produce high output, his outside option remains constant at w, but it increases to w the ﬁrst time
that he produces high output. We also assume that a worker who collects his outside option can
no longer be hired by the ﬁrm.10 Therefore, the value of a worker’s outside option is determined
by his reputation at the time he ﬁrst collects it. Finally, workers cannot observe the history of play
before they enter the market.11
Firm. The ﬁrm is inﬁnitely–lived, risk–neutral, and discounts future utility at a rate δf ∈ (0,1).12
It can employ at most one worker. The ﬂow payoﬀ to the ﬁrm when it does not employ a worker
is Π < y − w. So, the ﬁrm would rather employ a worker it knows is of the low type at his outside
option than not employ any worker. We normalize payoﬀs to the ﬁrm by (1 − δf).
Besides an ‘incumbent’, a worker employed by the ﬁrm in the previous period and who is still
in the market, the only other worker the ﬁrm can employ in a given period is the available age
1 worker. At the beginning of each period the ﬁrm can oﬀer a worker to pay him a wage of at
least w at the end of the period if he accepts employment. In particular, implicit bonus payments
are possible. The ﬁrm can also commit to oﬀer a worker of age k ≤ T − 1 a one–period wage of
at least w0 in the next q ∈ {1,...,T − k} periods. Thus, an oﬀer to a worker is a list (w,(q,w0))
consisting of a one–period wage oﬀer w and the number q of subsequent periods in which the ﬁrm
is committed to make a one–period wage oﬀer of w0 or more to him. If the ﬁrm oﬀers (w,(q,w0))
with q ≥ 1 to a worker, then it must propose (w,0) with w ≥ w0 to him in the next q periods. Note
that w0 needs to be speciﬁed only if q ≥ 1. We say the ﬁrm oﬀers (q +1 periods of ) ‘probation’ to
an age 1 worker when it oﬀers him (w,(q,w0)) with q ≥ 1.13
Observe that explicit output–contingent contracts are not possible. We discuss in Section 7
the extent to which our results hold when such contracts are feasible. In order to simplify the
10The no recall restriction amounts to assuming that once a worker collects his outside option, he no longer generates
information about his ability that is valuable to the ﬁrm.
11Thus, workers cannot coordinate their behavior in response to deviations by the ﬁrm. We will see that together
with the ﬁnite lifetime of workers this prevents the use of implicit bonus payments. In light of our results in the full
commitment case, see Section 7, we believe that this assumption is not crucial for our results.
12The assumption that the ﬁrm and the workers have diﬀerent discount factors is to emphasize that only the ﬁrm’s
discount factor matters for the results of interest.







s is the smallest one–period wage oﬀer that it is committed to make s periods from now.
8exposition, we also assume that the ﬁrm cannot oﬀer a worker a wage smaller than w. We discuss
the assumption of limited liability at the end of the section.
The following restriction is a maintained assumption in the rest of the paper:
(A1) αy + (1 − α)y − w > φ0y + (1 − φ0)y − w.
The right–hand side of the above inequality is an upper bound to the ﬂow payoﬀ the ﬁrm obtains
from an age 1 worker. Thus, (A1) states that the ﬁrm’s ﬂow proﬁt from employing an age 1 worker
is always smaller than its ﬂow payoﬀ from employing a worker of the high type. A necessary
condition for (A1) is φ0 < α.
Timing. The sequence of events in a period is as follows. If the ﬁrm has no incumbent, then it
either collects its outside option or makes an oﬀer to the available age 1 worker. If the ﬁrm has
an incumbent to which it is committed to make a one–period wage oﬀer, then it makes him such
an oﬀer. If the ﬁrm has an incumbent, but it is not committed to make him an oﬀer, then it can
collect its outside option or make an oﬀer, either to the incumbent or to the available age 1 worker.
The worker who receives an oﬀer decides whether to accept it or not. In case he accepts the oﬀer,
he chooses how much eﬀort to exert, output is realized, and the ﬁrm pays him a wage that is not
smaller than the wage promised at the beginning of the period. A worker who does not receive an
oﬀer or rejects one collects his outside option, and so does the ﬁrm if its oﬀer is rejected.
Equilibrium. Let Σw be the set of behavior strategies for a worker and Σf be the set of behavior
strategies for the ﬁrm. Since workers do not observe the history of play before they enter the market,
the set Σw is the same for all workers. A strategy proﬁle for the workers is a map σw : N → Σ,
where σw(t) is the behavior strategy of the worker who enters the market in period t. A strategy
proﬁle (σw,σf) ∈ ΣN
w × Σf is worker–symmetric if σw(t) is independent of t. We restrict attention
to worker–symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria.14
Discussion. We ﬁnish this section with a discussion of some of our assumptions.
Labor Market. As in a standard career concerns model—see Holmstr¨ om (1999)—we focus on a
labor market where talent is valuable but scarce and is revealed over time through performance.
14One alternative to the assumption that workers follow symmetric strategies is to consider an environment where
in each period the identity of the worker who becomes available is random. The approach we follow is simpler.
9Thus, a worker is able to command a higher wage once he produces high output. Diﬀerently
from a standard career concerns model, though, we consider a market where ﬁrms possess enough
monopsony power to be able to extract more surplus from a match with a talented worker than
from a match with a worker of unproven ability. Without imperfect competition, the ﬁrm would
not beneﬁt from identifying talented workers.
A further departure from standard career concerns models is the assumption we that a worker’s
outside option does not decrease below its initial level: wR(φ) = w for all φ ≤ φ0. This is the case,
for instance, if there is a secondary labor market where talent is not valuable for production and
the wage is w.
Limited Liability. We assume the ﬁrm cannot oﬀer a one–period wage that is smaller than w.
Notice, however, that a worker of age k ≤ T − 1 who has yet to prove his talent—this includes
age 1 workers—is willing to work for the ﬁrm for less than w. Indeed, by working for the ﬁrm,
such a worker has the chance to prove that he is of high ability, in which case his outside option
increases from w to w. The key observation is that among the workers of unproven talent, the one
who is willing to sacriﬁce the most in terms of present wage payments is the age 1 worker. So,
with or without limited liability, the ﬁrm still faces an opportunity cost when it retains a worker
of uncertain ability after he performs poorly.
Eﬀort. Eﬀort has two roles in our environment. First, it increases the likelihood of high output.
Second, it makes performance more informative about ability. We are interested on the second role
of eﬀort. As such, we abstract from the incentive problem the ﬁrm faces when it employs a worker
of high ability by assuming that explicit compensation schemes are not feasible—the only workers
who can beneﬁt from eﬀort are the ones who have yet to prove their talent. The focus on the
informational role of eﬀort is made possible by (A1), which implies that regardless of his behavior,
a talented worker is better for the ﬁrm than any other worker.
4 Preliminary Analysis
In this section we present results that will be useful for the analysis to follow. Observe ﬁrst that
both an age 1 worker and an incumbent of age T − 1 or less who has never produced high output
10always accept an oﬀer by the ﬁrm. Indeed, by accepting employment, such a worker receives at
least w and has the chance to prove himself to be talented before he is of age T.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, both an age 1 worker and an incumbent of age T − 1 or less who has
never produced high output accept any oﬀer by the ﬁrm.
It is immediate to see that both a worker known to be of the high type and a worker of age
T who has never produced high output always accept an oﬀer where the one–period wage w is
greater than their respective outside options. This observation is also true when w is equal to their
respective outside options since y − w > Π.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, both an incumbent known to be of the high type and an incumbent of
age T who has never produced high output accept an oﬀer with the one–period wage equal to their
respective outside options.
A consequence of Lemmas 1 and 2 is that the ﬁrm never collects its outside option.
Lemma 3. In equilibrium, the ﬁrm makes an oﬀer in every period and its oﬀers are never rejected.
The next result shows that implicit bonus payments are not possible for workers who are known
to be of the high type, and so such workers never exert eﬀort.
Lemma 4. Suppose the ﬁrm has an incumbent it knows is of the high type and let w0 be the smallest
one–period wage the ﬁrm can oﬀer him if it is committed to make him an oﬀer. The following holds
in equilibrium: (i) the ﬁrm never oﬀers the incumbent a one–period wage greater than max{w,w0};
(ii) if the ﬁrm makes the incumbent an oﬀer, then it never commits to future one–period wage oﬀers
greater than w; (iii) if the incumbent accepts employment, then the ﬁrm pays him the one–period
wage it oﬀered him; (iv) the incumbent never exerts eﬀort.
Notice, by (i), that if the ﬁrm has an incumbent it knows is of the high type, and is not
committed to make him an oﬀer, then it never oﬀers him a one–period wage greater than w. A
sketch of the proof of Lemma 4 is as follows. Consider a worker known to be of the high type
who is in his last period of employment. Implicit bonus payments are not possible in this case, for
otherwise the ﬁrm would have a proﬁtable deviation. Hence, the only incentive for such a worker
11to exert eﬀort is the variation of his future payoﬀ in his output. This variation, however, is zero
even if this period is not the worker’s last period of life, for his reputation does not change with
his output. Thus, no eﬀort is uniquely optimal for him. This, in turn, implies the ﬁrm has no
incentive to oﬀer a one–period wage greater than max{w,w0} to the worker. The desired result
now follows from a backward induction argument and Lemma 2—a consequence of Lemma 2 is that
an incumbent known to be of the high type never punishes the ﬁrm for a deviation by rejecting an
oﬀer with a one–period wage equal to w.
An immediate corollary to Lemma 4 is that the ﬁrm always pays a worker who produces high
output for the ﬁrst time the one–period wage it oﬀered him. Thus, we can only observe implicit
bonus payments when the ﬁrm either employs an age 1 worker or an incumbent who has never
produced high output and only after either worker produces low output.
Corollary 1. In equilibrium, the ﬁrm pays a worker who produces high output for the ﬁrst time
the one–period wage it oﬀers him.
The next result follows from the fact that workers use symmetric strategies. It states that the
ﬁrm’s (expected) continuation value from hiring an age 1 worker is independent of calendar time.
This introduces a recursive structure in the ﬁrm’s problem, which plays a key role in our analysis.
In what follows, let V (h|σ) denote the ﬁrm’s expected discounted payoﬀ after a history h when the
strategy proﬁle under play is σ.
Lemma 5. If σ is an equilibrium, then V (h|σ) = V (h0|σ) for any two histories h and h0 for the
ﬁrm after which it makes an oﬀer to the available age 1 worker.
By Lemma 4, the ﬁrm always obtains the same (ﬂow) payoﬀ when it employs a worker of high
ability at wage w. By (A1), this is also the highest payoﬀ the ﬁrm can obtain. Moreover, by
Lemma 5, the ﬁrm’s continuation value when it hires an age 1 worker is independent of calendar
time. Thus, the ﬁrm retains an incumbent it knows is of the high type both when it is not committed
to make him an oﬀer and when it has promised to oﬀer him a one–period wage smaller than w.
For convenience, in what follows we sometimes say that the ﬁrm ‘oﬀers w’ to a worker whenever it
makes an oﬀer where the one–period wage is w.
12Lemma 6. Suppose the ﬁrm has an incumbent it knows is of the high type and let w0 be the smallest
one–period wage the ﬁrm can oﬀer him if it is committed to make him an oﬀer. In equilibrium, the
ﬁrm oﬀers max{w,w0} to this worker, who accepts such an oﬀer.
Consider the IID case and suppose the ﬁrm has an incumbent who has only produced low
output. Then, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ by hiring the available age 1 worker if the incumbent will never
exert eﬀort.
Lemma 7. Consider an equilibrium in the IID case and suppose the ﬁrm has an incumbent who
has only produced low output. If the incumbent will never exert eﬀort, then the ﬁrm only makes
him an oﬀer if it is committed to do so.
Consider now the non–IID case and suppose the ﬁrm has an incumbent who has only produced
low output and did not exert eﬀort in the previous period. The same logic of the proof of Lemma
7 proves that if the incumbent will never exert eﬀort, then the ﬁrm only makes him an oﬀer if it is
committed to do so.
Lemma 8. Consider an equilibrium in the non–IID case and suppose the ﬁrm has an incumbent
who has only produced low output and did not exert eﬀort in the previous period. If the incumbent
will never exert eﬀort, then the ﬁrm only makes him an oﬀer if it is committed to do so.
5 The IID Case
In this section we investigate the role of commitment to employment when, conditional on a worker’s
type, the impact of eﬀort on output is identical and independent over time. We divide the analysis
in two parts. First, we consider the case where
φ0ηδw(1 − δT−1
w )[v(w) − v(w)] ≤ (1 − δw)c. (1)
Then, we consider the case where
φ0ηδw(1 − δT−1
w )[v(w) − v(w)] > (1 − δw)c. (2)
Observe that the left–hand side of (1) and (2) is the lifetime payoﬀ gain from eﬀort to an age 1
worker who is dismissed after low output, whereas the right–hand side of each expression is the
13discounted one–period cost of eﬀort. Thus, it is only when (2) holds that a worker of age 1 who
anticipates he is dismissed after low output has an incentive to exert eﬀort.
When (1) is satisﬁed we prove that: (i) a worker of age 2 or more who has only produced low
output never exerts eﬀort when employed; and (ii) oﬀering probation to an age 1 worker decreases
his incentive to exert eﬀort. Thus, it is uniquely optimal for the ﬁrm to dismiss any incumbent
who has only produced low output. As a result, there exists no equilibrium where the ﬁrm oﬀers
probation to a worker of age 1 when (1) holds. Equilibria where the ﬁrm oﬀers probation to age 1
workers exist when (2) is satisﬁed, though. We provide an example in Appendix B. Nevertheless,
there exists an equilibrium σ∗ where the ﬁrm never oﬀers probation to age 1 workers and such that
the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ in this equilibrium is greater than its payoﬀ in any equilibrium in which it oﬀers
commitment. Hence, commitment to employment has no value in either case.
Proposition 1. Suppose (1) holds. There is no equilibrium where the ﬁrm oﬀers probation to a
worker of age 1.
A sketch of the proof of Proposition 1 is as follows. First recall that implicit bonus payments
are not possible for an incumbent of age T who has never produced high output, and so such a
worker has no incentive to exert eﬀort. Consider then a worker of age k ∈ {1,...,T − 1} who
has only produced low output, let π ≤ φ0 be his (private) belief that he is of the high type, and
suppose the ﬁrm employs him—notice that π < φ0 if k ≥ 2. The worker’s incentive–compatibility


















where wy is the wage the ﬁrm pays him if his output is y, and R(y,e|π,k) is his continuation payoﬀ
if he chooses e and produces y, which depends on π and k. Since the worker reveals himself to
be of high ability if he produces high output, R(y,e|π,k) = R(y,e|π,k) by Lemmas 4 and 6. This
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14Let w be the one–period wage the ﬁrm oﬀered to the worker. By Corollary 1, wy = w, and so
∆0 ≤ 0. We prove that ∆1 is bounded above by (1 − δw)−1(1 − δT−k
w )[v(w) − v(w)], that ∆2 is
bounded above by zero, and that both upper bounds are achieved only if the worker is dismissed
after low output. Thus, (4) cannot be satisﬁed when k ≥ 2 and is only satisﬁed when k = 1 if the
worker is dismissed after low output and (1) holds with equality.
We can then conclude that an incumbent of age 2 or more who has only produced low output
never exerts eﬀort and that an age 1 worker has an incentive to exert eﬀort only if (1) holds with
equality and he is dismissed after low output. This implies that in equilibrium the ﬁrm always
oﬀers (w,0) to an age 1 worker and dismisses him if he produces low output. In particular, the
ﬁrm never oﬀers probation in equilibrium.
Suppose now that (2) holds and let σ∗ be the strategy proﬁle where: (i) the ﬁrm oﬀers (w,0) to
an incumbent it knows is of high ability; (ii) the ﬁrm oﬀers the available age 1 worker (w,0) if it has
no incumbent or if its incumbent has always produced low output and the ﬁrm is not committed to
employ him; (iii) the ﬁrm oﬀers an incumbent (w,0) if it is committed to oﬀer him a one–period
wage of at least w; (iv) the ﬁrm pays the one–period wage it oﬀers; (v) an incumbent of the high
type does not exert eﬀort; (vi) the eﬀort choice of any other worker is sequentially rational given
the ﬁrm’s oﬀer and (i) to (v). Notice that under σ∗ a worker of age 1 exerts eﬀort if the ﬁrm oﬀers
him (w,0). Indeed, by (ii), an age 1 worker knows he is dismissed after low output, in which case
his incentive–compatibility constraint for eﬀort exertion is satisﬁed.
We claim that σ∗ is an equilibrium, that the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ under σ∗ is the highest payoﬀ that it
can obtain, and that the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ under any equilibrium σ where it oﬀers probation to an age
1 worker is strictly smaller than the payoﬀ it obtains under σ∗.
Proposition 2. The strategy proﬁle σ∗ is an equilibrium and the payoﬀ V ∗ to the ﬁrm under
σ∗ is the greatest payoﬀ it can obtain in equilibrium. In particular, the payoﬀ to the ﬁrm in any
equilibrium where it oﬀers probation to an age 1 worker is strictly smaller than V ∗.
By Lemmas 4 and 6, we only need to show that the ﬁrm’s decision in (ii) is incentive–compatible
in order to prove that σ∗ is an equilibrium. The incentive–compatibility of (ii) follows from the fact
that an age 1 worker exerts eﬀort when the ﬁrm oﬀers him (w,0). The second part of Proposition
152 follows from the fact that an incumbent of age 2 or more who has never produced high output is
always less proﬁtable to the ﬁrm than an age 1 worker who exerts eﬀort.
There exist other equilibria where the ﬁrm obtains the same payoﬀ as it obtains under σ∗. For
instance, the strategy proﬁle that diﬀers from σ∗ only in that the ﬁrm oﬀers (w,(T − 2,w)) to
an age 2 incumbent who has produced high output in his ﬁrst period of employment is also an
equilibrium. The proof of Proposition 2 shows that any equilibrium where the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is V ∗
can diﬀer from σ∗ only in the amount commitment the ﬁrm oﬀers to an incumbent it knows is of
the high type.
6 The non–IID Case
We now consider the case where eﬀort has an impact on both current and future output. In this
case we prove that there exists scope for commitment to probation when eﬀort mostly aﬀects future
output. For simplicity, we consider the situation in which η(e,e) = 0 and η(e,e) = η(e,e). It will
become clear from our analysis that the results we obtain also hold when η(e,e) and η(e,e)−η(e,e)
are positive but small. Let α + η(e,e) = γ > α and recall that e− = e for an age 1 worker. When
η(e,e) = η(e,e) − η(e,e) = 0, the non–IID case is summarized by the following two information
matrices:
e− = e y y
H α 1 − α
L 0 1
e− = e y y
H γ 1 − γ
L 0 1
Notice that an age 1 worker has no incentive to exert eﬀort if he anticipates he is dismissed
after low output. In fact, a worker of age 1 only beneﬁts from exerting eﬀort if he is retained after
low output, for in this case his output when he is of age 2 is more informative about his ability.
In what follows we identify circumstances in which an age 1 worker is willing to exert eﬀort if he
expects to be retained after low output. This is in stark contrast to the IID case, where either the
threat of dismissal after low output is suﬃcient to induce an age 1 worker to exert eﬀort, or the
promise of retention after low output discourages such a worker to exert eﬀort. Thus, the ﬁrm can
beneﬁt from retaining an age 1 worker who produces low output. Moreover, we will see that there
16exist situations in which the ﬁrm retains such a worker only if it explicitly promises to do so, that
is, only if to commits to employment. The question we address is whether the gain to the ﬁrm from
inducing an age 1 worker to exert eﬀort through the use of commitment can compensate it for the
lack of ﬂexibility in employment decisions that commitment entails.
We divide our analysis in three parts. First, we derive conditions under which the ﬁrm can
only induce an age 1 worker to exert eﬀort if it oﬀers probation. Then, we identify situations in
which the ﬁrm beneﬁts from oﬀering commitment. We are interested in the case where the gain to
the ﬁrm is not due to the extra output a worker produces when he exerts eﬀort, but to the extra
information about ability that this eﬀort generates. We conclude by showing that it is possible for
commitment to be both necessary for an age 1 worker to exert eﬀort and beneﬁcial for the ﬁrm.
6.1 Commitment is Necessary
Let φ = (1 − α)φ0/(1 − φ0α) and φ(e) = (1 − α)(1 − ξ(e))φ0/[(1 − α)(1 − ξ(e))φ0 + 1 − φ0], where
ξ(e) = α and ξ(e) = γ. Note that φ is the reputation of an age 2 worker who produces low output
in his ﬁrst period of employment and that φ(e) is the reputation of an age 3 worker who chooses
e ∈ {e,e} in his ﬁrst period of employment and produces low output in his ﬁrst two periods of
employment. We make the following two assumptions:
(A2) φ0(1 − α)(γ − α)δ2
w(1 − δT−2
w )[v(w) − v(w)] > (1 − δw)c;
(A3) φ(1 − α)(γ − α)δ2
w(1 − δT−3
w )[v(w) − v(w)] < (1 − δw)c.
In order to understand (A2), consider an age 1 worker who accepts employment and suppose
that: (i) the ﬁrm oﬀers him (w,0) in the next period if he produces low output, but dismisses him
if he produces low output one more time; (ii) the ﬁrm never pays him a bonus; (iii) his ﬂow payoﬀ
is v(w) after he produces high output for the ﬁrst time. Since η(e,e) = η(e,e) for all e ∈ {e,e},
the worker has no incentive to exert eﬀort when of age 2 if he produces low output in his ﬁrst
period of employment. The incentive–compatibility constraint for eﬀort exertion in his ﬁrst period
17of employment is then




(1 − δw)v(w) + φγδw(1 − δT−2
w )v(w) + (1 − φγ)δw(1 − δT−2
w )v(w)





(1 − δw)v(w) + φαδw(1 − δT−2




which is satisﬁed by virtue of (A2).
Consider now (A3). It is easy to see that this condition implies that an age 2 worker who failed
to produce high output in his ﬁrst period of employment does not exert eﬀort if (i), (ii), and (iii)
from the previous paragraph hold for him. It turns out that (A3) implies that no worker of age
2 or more who has only produced low output has an incentive to exert eﬀort—we prove this in
Appendix A. In other words, (A3) implies that the only worker who can ever exert eﬀort is an
age 1 worker. A straightforward consequence of this fact is that the ﬁrm always pays a worker the
one–period wage it oﬀers him.
Lemma 9. In equilibrium, a worker of age k ≥ 2 never exerts eﬀort when employed.
An implication of Lemmas 8 and 9 is that the ﬁrm only hires an incumbent of age 3 or more
who has never produced high output if it is committed to do so. We now establish that there
exist situations in which the ﬁrm retains an incumbent of age 2 who failed to produce high output
when of age 1 only if it is committed to do so. Hence, in such circumstances, the ﬁrm must oﬀer
probation to an age 1 worker if he is to exert eﬀort. In what follows, let y(φ,ξ) = φξy + (1 − φξ)y
be the expected output of a worker with reputation φ when the probability that he produces high
output is ξ, ∆y = (y−y), ∆w = w−w, and ∆ = [y(1,α)−w]−[y(φ0,α)−w] = α(1−φ0)∆y −∆w.
Then, ∆ < α(1 − φ0)∆y. Notice that (A1) implies that ∆ > φ0(1 − α)∆y.




(γ − α)∆y + ∆ + φ0α(γ − α)∆y(T − 2)
(1 + φ0α)∆y + {∆ + φ0α[1 − (γ − α)]∆y}(T − 2)

. (5)
There exists δf ∈ (0,1) such that if δf ≥ δf, then in equilibrium an incumbent of age 2 who
has failed to produce high output in his ﬁrst period of employment is dismissed unless the ﬁrm is
committed to make him an oﬀer.
18Note that φ0α is the probability that an age 1 worker produces high output, while φγ is an
upper bound on the probability that an age 2 worker who produced low output in his ﬁrst period
of employment, produces high output. Proposition 3 is then not surprising when φγ ≤ φ0α—in
fact, δf = 0 in this case. However, as we will argue in the next subsection, we are interested in the
case where φγ > φ0α. In this second case, the ﬁrm’s ﬂow payoﬀ when it employs an age 2 worker
who exerted eﬀort in his ﬁrst period of employment but failed to produce high output is greater
than the ﬁrm’s ﬂow payoﬀ when it employs an age 1 worker. So, the ﬁrm needs to be suﬃciently
patient for the result to hold.
A sketch of the proof of Proposition 3 helps us understand how condition (5) is derived. The
complete proof is in Appendix A. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is an equilibrium σ with
a history b h for the ﬁrm after which, even though not committed to do so, it oﬀers (w,(q,w0)) to
an age 2 worker who failed to produce high output in his ﬁrst period of employment. Denote the
worker who receives this oﬀer by W. By Lemma 9, a worker of age 2 or more never exerts eﬀort
when employed. Hence, σ can be an equilibrium only if q = 0 and w = w. Assume that this is the
case and let V = V (h|σ) for any history h for the ﬁrm after which it makes an oﬀer to an age 1
worker. By (A2), W exerts eﬀort in his ﬁrst period of employment. So,
V = [y(1,α) − w] −
(1 − δf)∆ + δf(1 − δf){φ0α[y(1,α) − y(1,γ)] + (1 − φ0α)∆0}
1 − δ2




where ∆0 = [y(1,α) − w] − [y(φ,γ) − w]. Now observe that
V (b h|σ) = (1 − δf)[y(φ,γ) − w] + φγ
n
δf(1 − δT−2
f )[y(1,α) − w] + δT−1
f V
o
+ (1 − φγ)δfV
= δfV + (1 − δf)
(









We are done if V > e V for δf suﬃciently close to one—this implies the ﬁrm can proﬁtably deviate
after b h by replacing W with the available age 1 worker.15 Straightforward algebra shows that (5)
is necessary and suﬃcient for V > e V when δf is suﬃciently high.





when φγ ≤ φ0α. It is easy to see that V (b h|σ) < V for all δf ∈ (0,1) in this case.
19It follows from the previous paragraph that an increase in γ has two opposing eﬀects. First, it
increases V , the value to the ﬁrm from hiring an age 1 worker. Second, it increases V (b h|σ), the
value to the ﬁrm from retaining an age 2 worker who exerts eﬀort and produces low output when
of age 1. Nevertheless, the second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst, that is, increasing γ makes it more
diﬃcult for (5) to be satisﬁed. For this, notice that (5) is equivalent to
(1 − α)γ < α(1 − φ0α)

[1 − α + φ0α(T − 1)]∆y + (T − 1)∆ + γ∆y
(1 + φ0α)∆y + (T − 2)[∆ + φ0α(1 + α)∆y] − γφ0α(T − 2)∆y

.
Now observe that we can rewrite the above inequality as
f(γ) = γ2A + γB + C > 0,
where A = (1 − α)φ0α(T − 2)∆y, C = α(1 − φ0α){[1 − α + φ0α(T − 1)]∆y + (T − 1)∆}, and
B = α(1 − φ0α)∆y − (1 − α){(1 + φ0α)∆y + (T − 2)[∆ + φ0α(1 + α)∆y]}.
Since ∆ > φ0(1 − α)∆y by (A1), we then have that
f0(1) = φ0α(1 − α)2(T − 2)∆y − (1 − α)(T − 2)∆ + [α(1 − φ0α) − (1 − α)(1 + φ0α)]∆y
<

φ0α(1 − α)2 − φ0(1 − α)2
(T − 2)∆y +

φ0α − φ(1 + φ0α)
 (1 − φ0α)∆y
φ0
.
Our interest is in the case where φγ > φ0α, and a necessary condition for this is φ > φ0α. Hence,
f0(1) < 0, and so f is decreasing in the interval (α,1). This establishes the desired result.
Observe ﬁnally that Proposition 3 holds when φ(e)γ < φ0α even if (A3) is not satisﬁed. Indeed,
φ(e) is the largest reputation possible for a worker of age 3 or more who has only produced low
output. Therefore, when φ(e)γ < φ0α, the ﬁrm only hires an age k ≥ 3 worker who has never
produced high output if it is committed to do so—a proof of this result follows along the lines of
the proof of Lemma 7. The above sketch of the proof of Proposition 3 shows that it is precisely
this last fact that implies the result.
6.2 Commitment is Beneﬁcial
Assume that the conditions of Proposition 3 are satisﬁed, so that commitment to employment is
necessary for age 1 workers to exert eﬀort. Recall that the ﬁrm beneﬁts in two ways when a worker
20of age 1 exerts eﬀort. First, it gains additional output when this worker is of age 2. Second, the
output of this worker when he is of age 2 is more informative about his ability. As discussed at
the end of Section 3, the focus of our analysis is on the informational role of eﬀort. Given our
objective, we now derive conditions under which the use of probation is beneﬁcial to the ﬁrm just
for the informational gain from inducing an age 1 worker to exert eﬀort.
In order to quantify the informational gain from inducing an age 1 worker to exert eﬀort, consider
ﬁrst the situation in which the ﬁrm cannot oﬀer commitment, that is, the ﬁrm is constrained to oﬀer
q = 0 to all workers. Let V1 be the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ in this case. In light of the previous subsection, if
φγ is not too large, then the ﬁrm always dismisses an age 1 worker who produces low output when
it is patient enough. In fact, the conditions under which the ﬁrm dismisses such a worker are the
same as those of Proposition 3—this follows from the proof of Proposition 3. Thus, V1 satisﬁes
V1 = (1 − δf)[y(φ0,α) − w] + φ0α
n
δf(1 − δT−1
f )[y(1,α) − w] + δT
f V1
o
+ (1 − φ0α)δfV1.
Solving the above equation for V1 we obtain that
V1 =
(1 − δf)[y(φ0,α) − w] + φ0αδf(1 − δT−1
f )[y(1,α) − w]








1 − δf + φ0αδf(1 − δT−1
f )
.
Consider now the case where the extra output a worker generates when he exerts eﬀort is lost,
so that the only gain from commitment is informational. Since the ﬁrm has always the option of
oﬀering (w,(1,w)) to an age 1 worker, it can obtain a payoﬀ of at least V 0
2, where
V 0
2 = (1 − δf)[y(φ0,α) − w] + φ0α
n
δf(1 − δT−1



















In fact, Lemmas 8 and 9 hold in this case as well, so the ﬁrm still dismisses an incumbent of age 3
or more who has only produced low output if it is not committed to make an oﬀer to him. Then,





(1 − δf)[y(φ0,α) − w] + δf(1 − δf){φ0α[y(1,α) − w] + (1 − φ0α)[y(φ,α) − w]}
1 − δ2




φ0[α + γ(1 − α)]δ2
f(1 − δT−2
f )[y(1,α) − w]
1 − δ2




(1 − δf)[y(φ0,α) − w] + [δf(1 − δf) + φ0[α + γ(1 − α)]δ2
f(1 − δT−2
f )][y(1,α) − w]
1 − δ2




(1 − φ0α)δf(1 − δf){[y(1,α) − w] − [y(φ,α) − w]}
1 − δ2














By construction, a suﬃcient condition for the informational gain from commitment to be positive
is then V 0
2 > V1. Moreover, by Lemma 9, the ﬁrm does not gain from oﬀering more than two periods
of probation to an age 1 worker. Hence, V 0
2 > V1 is also necessary for the informational gain of
commitment to be positive. Now observe that
V 0
2 − V1 = [λ1 − λ2(1 + δf(1 − φ0α))]∆ − δfλ2(1 − φ0α)[y(φ0,α) − y(φ,α)]
= {λ1 − λ2[1 + δf(1 − φ0α)(1 + ψ)]}∆,
where ψ = [y(φ0,α) − y(φ,α)]/∆, and that
(1 − δf)−1 {λ1 − λ2[1 + δf(1 − φ0α)(1 + ψ)]} =
φ0γ(1 − α)δ2
f(1 − δT−2
f ) − δf(1 − δf)(1 − φ0α)ψ − φ0α(1 − φ0α)(1 + ψ)δ2
f(1 − δT−1
f ).
So, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the gain in information to be beneﬁcial for the ﬁrm is
φ0(1 − α)
1 − φ0α












f ) in (8) reﬂects the fact that even if the output of an age 2 worker
is more informative about his ability than the output of an age 1 worker, the former lives for one
less period than the latter. This diﬀerence in lifetimes is more important the more patient the ﬁrm
is, but it decreases with the lifetime T of the workers—the ratio (1 − δT−1
f )/(1 − δT−2
f ) increases
with δf and decreases with T. The term y(φ0,α) − y(φ,α) = ψ∆ is the loss in ﬂow payoﬀ to the
ﬁrm when it retains an incumbent of age 2 who failed to produce high output if the extra output a
worker generates when he exerts eﬀort is lost. For a ﬁxed δf, this loss is less important for the ﬁrm
the greater T is—both terms on the right–hand side of (8) decrease with T. In fact, the beneﬁt to
the ﬁrm from being able to identify the ability of the workers increases with their lifetime.
6.3 Probation
Condition (8) reduces to







when δf converges to one. There is a natural tension between (5) and (9). We need φγ > φ0α for
the informational gain from commitment to be positive. The diﬀerence between φγ and φ0α cannot
be too large, though, for otherwise the ﬁrm would retain an age 2 worker who exerted eﬀort and
produced low output in his ﬁrst period of employment regardless of its discount factor, rendering
commitment unnecessary. Nevertheless, it is possible to show that (5) and (9) can both be satisﬁed
when T is large; we know from above that T large helps the informational gain from commitment
be positive. The details of the argument are in Appendix B.
Proposition 4. Suppose that




∆ + φ0α[1 − (γ − α)]∆y

.
There exists T ≥ 3 with the property that if T ≥ T, then there exists δf ∈ (0,1) such that if δf ≥ δf,
then: (i) the ﬁrm always oﬀers probation to age 1 workers in equilibrium; (ii) the informational
gain from commitment is positive.
Proof: By assumption, there exists T such that both (5) and (9) are satisﬁed when T ≥ T. Suppose
then T ≥ T. This implies there exists δf ∈ (0,1) with the property that if δf ≥ δf, then: (i) in
23equilibrium, the ﬁrm dismisses an incumbent of age k ≥ 2 who has never produced high output
if it is not committed to employ him; (ii) the informational gain from commitment is positive.
Suppose now, by contradiction, that there is an equilibrium σ with a history b h for the ﬁrm after
which it oﬀers (w,0) to the available age 1 worker. By Lemma 5, the ﬁrm’s equilibrium payoﬀ is
V (b h|σ) = V1 given by (6). The ﬁrm, however, can always oﬀer (w,(1,w)) to an age 1 worker and
obtain a payoﬀ greater than V 0
2 given by (7), a contradiction.
Proposition 4 is silent as to how many periods of probation the ﬁrm oﬀers to age 1 workers. By
Lemma 9, however, a worker of age 2 or more never exerts eﬀort when employed. So, relative to
oﬀering two periods of probation to an age 1 worker, the ﬁrm cannot gain by oﬀering more than
two periods of employment, since this does not aﬀect the behavior of a worker when he is of age 2
or more. This implies, by a straightforward argument, that under the conditions of Proposition 4
the ﬁrm oﬀers always oﬀers (w,(1,w)) to age 1 workers.
One limitation of the analysis in the non–IID case is that there is no scope for more than two
periods of probation. This result is in part driven by the particular production technology we
consider. Speciﬁcally, by the assumption that there is a one–period delay in the eﬀect of eﬀort on
output. Our analysis, in principle, can allow for more than two periods of probation as an (unique)
equilibrium outcome if, for instance, it takes more than one period of eﬀort before eﬀort has an
impact on output.
7 Output–Contingent Contracts
Potentially there are several reasons why output–contingent contracts can fail to be feasible. One
possibility is that a third party responsible for the enforcement of contracts cannot distinguish
between high and low output. Output is of a very specialized nature in many of the environments
where probation is used. Another possibility is that the contingencies determining the level of
output cannot be described ex–ante.16 We are nevertheless interested in understanding the extent
to which our results are driven by the assumption that explicit output–contingent incentives are
not possible. In this section we address this issue by considering the case in which the ﬁrm has full
commitment power, and so can oﬀer long–term output–contingent contracts.
16Notice that the results of Maskin and Tirole (1999) on incomplete contracts do not apply to our setting.
24Let Y = {y,y} be the output space and denote a typical element of Y t, with t ≤ T, by yt. The
set Y t is the set of possible end–of–period output histories of length t; yt = (y1,...,yt) ∈ Y t is the
output history of a worker who produces ys in his sth period of employment, with s ≤ t. A wage
policy is a list ω = {ωt}T
t=1, with ωt : Y t → R, where ωt(yt) is the wage the ﬁrm pays to a worker
if his output history is yt. A retention policy is a list τ = {τt}T
t=2, with τt : Y t−1 → [0,1], where
τt(yt−1) is the probability the ﬁrm oﬀers employment to a worker with output history yt−1.17 Recall
that wages are paid at the end of a period, while retention decisions are made at the beginning of
a period. For any k ≤ t, let χt
k : Y t → Y k be such that χt
k(yt) is the projection of yt into its ﬁrst k
coordinates. A retention policy is consistent if τt(yt−1) > 0 is possible only when τk(χt−1
k−1(yt−1)) > 0
for all k ∈ {2,...,t − 1}. A long–term (output–contingent) contract is a pair (ω,τ) where ω is a
wage policy and τ is a consistent retention policy. The ﬁrm oﬀers long–term contracts to age 1
workers.
The timing of events in a period is as follows. Suppose the ﬁrm must oﬀer employment to
its incumbent according to the long–term contract (ω,τ) in place—this is the contract the ﬁrm
oﬀered to the incumbent when he was of age 1. In this case, the incumbent ﬁrst decides whether
to work for the ﬁrm or not. If he accepts employment, he then chooses whether to exert eﬀort
or not, output is realized, and the ﬁrm pays him according to ω. Note that we rule out implicit
bonus payments.18 If he rejects employment, both him and the ﬁrm collect their respective outside
options. Suppose now the ﬁrm either has no incumbent or has an incumbent that it must dismiss
according to the long–term contract in place. In these circumstances, the ﬁrm ﬁrst decides whether
it oﬀers a long–term contract to the available age 1 worker or not. If it does, then the timing is
as in the ﬁrst case. If it does not, then both the ﬁrm and the available age 1 worker collect their
respective outside options.
We still consider worker–symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria. For simplicity, we assume that
a worker who is known to be of the high type always accepts an oﬀer by the ﬁrm and always exerts
17Our results do not change if we allow for random wage policies. In fact, since workers are risk–averse, it is possible
to show that the ﬁrm never oﬀers a random wage policy in equilibrium. We restrict attention to deterministic wage
policies for ease of notation.
18This assumption is without any loss. Under full commitment, any outcome that involves bonus payments can be
replicated without the use of bonus payments by changing the long–term contracts oﬀered in an appropriate way.
25eﬀort if indiﬀerent between exerting eﬀort or not.19 As before, the ﬁrm’s continuation value when
it hires an age 1 worker is independent of calendar time. The proof of this fact is identical to the
proof of Lemma 5 in Section 4.
A straightforward consequence of (A1) and the fact that the ﬁrm’s continuation payoﬀ when
it hires an age 1 worker is independent of calendar time is that the ﬁrm always employs an age 2
worker who produced high output in his ﬁrst period of employment.
Lemma 10. In equilibrium, the ﬁrm always oﬀers (ω,τ) with τ2(y) = 1 to an age 1 worker and
an age 2 worker who is known to be of the high type always works for the ﬁrm.
Motivated by Lemma 10, we say that the ﬁrm oﬀers probation to an age 1 worker if it oﬀers
him a long–term contract (ω,τ) with τ2(y) > 0. As discussed in Section 3, our emphasis is on the
informational role of eﬀort. So, we assume that choosing no eﬀort is optimal for a worker known
to be of the high type in both the IID case and the non–IID case. We provide conditions for this
to hold below. Thus, as in the case without full commitment, eﬀort can only be beneﬁcial for the
ﬁrm if it is exerted by a worker who has yet to prove his talent. The diﬀerence is that now the ﬁrm
can supplement career concerns motives for eﬀort exertion with explicit incentives.
We assume in this section that v is continuously diﬀerentiable. Given the supplementary nature
of this section, the analysis will be somewhat terse.
7.1 IID Case
Consider the static principal–agent problem involving the ﬁrm and a worker of the high type and
let R(e) denote the highest payoﬀ possible for the ﬁrm when the worker’s choice of eﬀort is e. It is
straightforward to show that R(e) = r(w,e), where r(w,e) = y(1,α) − w and













Since v−1 is convex, r(w,e) ≤ G(w), where G(w) = y(1,α)+η∆y −v−1 (v(w) + c). We then make
the following assumption:
(A4) v−1 (v(w) + c) − w > η∆y.
19This is true in equilibrium since the ﬁrm can break ties in incentive–compatibility and participation constraints
by making inﬁnitesimal changes in the wage policy.
26Condition (A4) has a natural interpretation. It implies that the lowest increase in the expected
wage payment necessary to compensate a worker of the high type for exerting eﬀort is smaller than
the expected increase in output when such a worker exerts eﬀort. If v(w) = w, (A4) reduces to
η∆y < c. A consequence of Assumption (A4) is that the ﬁrm never oﬀers a long–term contract
that induces an incumbent known to be of the high type to exert eﬀort when employed.
Lemma 11. In equilibrium, the ﬁrm pays a worker known to be of the high type his outside option
and such a worker never exerts eﬀort.
An immediate implication of Lemma 11 and (A1) is that the ﬁrm always makes an oﬀer to an
incumbent it knows is of high ability. Let YH be the subset of
ST
t=1 Y t such that yk = (y1,...,yk)
belongs to YH if, and only if, at least one element of {y1,...,yk} is equal to y. Moreover, for any
yk ∈ Y k and yk0
∈ Y k0
, let ykyk0
denote the output history yk followed by the output history yk0
.
Lemma 12. In equilibrium, the ﬁrm only oﬀers (ω,τ) such that if yt−1 ∈ YH and τt(yt−1) > 0,
then τt+k(yt−1yk) = 1 for all yk ∈ Y k with 1 ≤ k ≤ T − t.
Suppose now that (1) holds, that is,
φ0ηδw(1 − δT−1
w )[v(w) − v(w)] ≤ (1 − δw)c.
We know from the analysis of Section 5 that unless (1) holds with equality, the ﬁrm needs to resort
to explicit incentives if it wishes an age 1 worker to exert eﬀort. The next result shows, as in the
case without full commitment, that it is never optimal for the ﬁrm to retain an age 1 worker who
produces low output.
Proposition 5. In equilibrium, the ﬁrm never oﬀers probation to age 1 workers when (1) holds.
Suppose instead that (2) holds, that is,
φ0ηδw(1 − δT−1
w )[v(w) − v(w)] > (1 − δw)c.
This implies that concerns for his future reputation are suﬃcient to induce an age 1 worker who is
dismissed after low output to exert eﬀort. With full commitment we are able to establish a stronger
result than Proposition 2 in Section 5. For this, let (ω∗,τ∗) be the long–term contract where: (i)
27τ∗
2(y) = 0; (ii) τ∗
k+1(yyk−1) = 1 for all yk−1 ∈ Y k−1 with 1 ≤ k ≤ T − 1, with the convention that
Y 0 is the empty set; (iii) ω1(y) ≡ w; (iv) ωk+1(yyk−1) = w for all yk ∈ Y k with 1 ≤ k ≤ T −1. By
construction, the ﬁrm obtains a lifetime payoﬀ of V ∗ when it oﬀers (ω∗,τ∗) to age 1 workers, where
V ∗ is the payoﬀ in the equilibrium σ∗ of Proposition 2. Now observe, by Lemma 11 and the proof
of Proposition 2, that V ∗ is still the highest payoﬀ the ﬁrm can obtain in any equilibrium. Thus,
the strategy proﬁle where the ﬁrm oﬀers (ω∗,τ∗) to age 1 workers is an equilibrium. Moreover,
from the proof of Proposition 2, there can be no equilibrium where ﬁrm oﬀers a long–term contract
with τ2(y) > 0. We have thus established the following result.
Proposition 6. In equilibrium, the ﬁrm never oﬀers probation to age 1 workers when (2) holds.
7.2 Non-IID Case
A key element in the analysis of the non–IID case is that it is necessary for the ﬁrm to retain an age
1 worker after he produces low output in order to induce him to exert eﬀort. This is no longer the
case when long–term contracts are possible, as the ﬁrm can now induce an age 1 worker to exert
eﬀort even if he is dismissed after low output. This is because the ﬁrm can promise to reward the
worker if he produces high output when he is of age 2.
We make the following assumption, which is the counterpart of (A4) to the non–IID case and
has a similar interpretation. The reason the discount factor of the worker appears in (A5) is that
an explicit contract can compensate a worker of the high type for his eﬀort only in the period after
he exerts it—in the non–IID case eﬀort only aﬀects future output.
(A5) v−1(v(w) + c/δw) − w > (γ − α)∆y.
Assumption (A5) implies that Lemmas 11 and 12 also hold in the non–IID case. The proof of
Lemma 12 is identical.
Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists an equilibrium in the non–IID case where the ﬁrm
does not oﬀer probation to an age 1 worker. By Lemma 12, an upper bound for the equilibrium
payoﬀ V to the ﬁrm is
V + =
(1 − δf)[y(φ0,α) − w] + φ0αδf
n
(1 − δf)[y(1,γ) − w] + δf(1 − δT−2
f )[y(1,α) − w]
o
1 − δf + φ0αδf(1 − δT−1
f )
. (10)
28Consider now the deviation for the ﬁrm where it oﬀers (ω∗,τ∗) such that: (i) ω1(y) ≡ w; (ii)
ωt(yyt−1) = w for all yt−1 ∈ Y t−1 with t ≥ 2; (iii) ω2(yy1) ≡ w; (iv) τ2(y) = 1; (v) τ3(yy) = 0;
(vi) τt(yyt−2) = 1 for all yt−2 ∈ Y t−2 with t ≥ 2; and (vii) τt(yyyt−3) = 1 for all yt−3 ∈ Y t−3 with
t ≥ 3. By (A2), the payoﬀ to the ﬁrm from this deviation is
V2 =
(1 − δf)[y(φ0,α) − w] + φ0αδf(1 − δf)[y(1,γ) − w] + (1 − φ0α)δf(1 − δf)[y(φ,γ) − w]
1 − δ2




φ0(α + γ(1 − α))δ2
f(1 − δT−2
f )[y(1,α) − w]
1 − δ2







V + = [y(1,α) − w] −
∆ − φ0α(γ − α)∆y




V2 = [y(1,α) − w] −
∆ − φ0α(γ − α)∆y + (1 − φ0α)∆0
2 + φ0(α + γ(1 − α))(T − 2)
,
where, as before, ∆ = [y(1,α) − w] − [y(φ0,α) − w] and ∆0 = [y(1,α) − w] − [y(φ,γ) − w]. Hence,
V2 > V + if, and only if,
∆ − φ0α(γ − α)∆y
1 + φ0α(T − 1)
≥
∆ − φ0α(γ − α)∆y + (1 − φ0α)∆0
2 + φ0(α + γ(1 − α))(T − 2)
. (12)
Since [2+φ0(α+γ(1−α))(T −2)]−[1+φ0α(T −1)] = 1−φ0α+φ0γ(1−α)(T −2), straightforward
algebra shows that (12) is equivalent to
1 + φγ(T − 2)
1 + φ0α(T − 1)
[∆ − φ0α(γ − α)∆y] > ∆ − (φγ − φ0α)∆y,
where we used the fact that ∆0 = ∆ + (φ0α − φγ)∆y. We thus have the following result, which is
an analogue to Proposition 4 for the full–commitment case.
Proposition 7. Suppose that φγ − φ0α > φ0α(γ − α). There exists T such that if T ≥ T, then in
equilibrium the ﬁrm always oﬀers probation to age 1 workers if it is patient enough.
8 Conclusion
This paper provides a rationale for the use of short–term commitment to employment in markets
where individual talent is uncertain. A ﬁrm can gain from oﬀering probation to workers of un-
known ability if this commitment encourages them to invest in their reputation, thus increasing
29the informativeness of their performance and so helping the ﬁrm identify their talent. We show
that probation can only be beneﬁcial if the eﬀect of eﬀort on performance is persistent, otherwise
probation never increases, and may actually decrease, the incentives of workers to invest in their
reputation. More precisely, we show that the ﬁrm can gain from oﬀering probation when the impact
of eﬀort on output is persistent but delayed. The reason for this is that probation solves a time–
consistency problem when it takes time for eﬀort to aﬀect output. In the absence of commitment,
the ﬁrm cannot credibly promise to retain a worker of uncertain talent whose initial performance
is poor, and this undermines his incentives to exert eﬀort. We also show that the use of explicit
output–contingent contracts cannot substitute for the use of probation.
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32Appendix A: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose, by contradiction, than an age T incumbent who has always produced
low output rejects an oﬀer of (w,0). The lifetime payoﬀ to the ﬁrm after this is (1 − δf)Π + δfV ,
where V is its continuation payoﬀ from next period on. Consider then the following deviation for the
ﬁrm: (i) oﬀer (w,0), with w > w, to the age T worker and pay him w regardless of his performance;
(ii) behave from next period on as if no deviation has occurred. The ﬁrm’s continuation payoﬀ
after this deviation is at least (1−δf)[y−w]+δfV . Since y−w > Π by assumption, this deviation
is proﬁtable as long as w is suﬃciently close to w, a contradiction. The other part of this lemma
follows from a similar argument and the fact that αy + (1 − α)y − w > y − w.
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose the ﬁrm is not committed to make an oﬀer to its incumbent or has
no incumbent. Since, by Lemma 1, an age 1 worker accepts (w,0), the same argument used in the
proof of Lemma 2 shows that the ﬁrm makes an oﬀer that is not rejected. Suppose now the ﬁrm is
committed to make an oﬀer to its incumbent. By Lemmas 1 and 2, we only need to consider the
case in which the incumbent is known to be of the high type and the lowest one–period wage the
ﬁrm can oﬀer is less than w. Once more, the same argument used in the proof of Lemma 2 shows
that the ﬁrm makes an oﬀer that is accepted.
Proof of Lemma 4: Denote the incumbent by W, let k ∈ {2,...,T} be his age, and let ` ∈
{0,...,T −k} be the maximum number of future periods that the ﬁrm employs W if it makes him
an oﬀer that he accepts. The proof is by induction in `.
We know from the main text that if ` = 0, then: (i) the ﬁrm never W oﬀers a one–period
wage greater than max{w,w0}; (ii) if the ﬁrm makes W an oﬀer, then it never commits to future
one–period wage oﬀers greater than w (trivially satisﬁed); (iii) if W accepts employment, then the
ﬁrm pays him the one–period wage it oﬀers; (iv) W does not exert eﬀort. We also know that if
the ﬁrm oﬀers W a one–period wage of w, then he accepts the oﬀer (regardless of k and `). In
particular, W will never punish the ﬁrm for a deviation by rejecting a one–period wage oﬀer of w.
Denote this last fact by (v).
33Suppose, by induction, that there exists `0 ∈ {0,...,T − k} such that (i) to (iv) hold if ` ≤ `0
and let ` = `0 + 1. We claim that (iii) is true. Suppose not and let w be the one–period wage the
ﬁrm oﬀers W. Consider the following deviation for the ﬁrm: pay w to W regardless of his output
and behave from next period on as if no deviation has occurred. This is a proﬁtable deviation
for the ﬁrm since its continuation payoﬀ after the deviation is the same by (v) and the induction
hypothesis. Thus, (iv) is also true, since W’s continuation payoﬀ does not depend on his output. It
is now easy to see that (i) and (ii) must also hold, for otherwise the ﬁrm could proﬁtably deviate
either by lowering its one–period wage oﬀer to W or by lowering the future one–period wage oﬀers
that it promises to W.
Proof of Lemma 5: Suppose there exist histories h and h0 for the ﬁrm after which it makes an
oﬀer to the available age 1 worker with V (h0|σ) > V (h|σ). Consider now the deviation for the
ﬁrm where it behaves after h as if h0 happened. Since workers follow symmetric strategies, this
deviation increases the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ after h by V (h0|σ) − V (h|σ), a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 6: Let σ be an equilibrium. By Lemma 4, an incumbent known to be of high
type never exerts eﬀort when employed. Moreover, such a worker always rejects an oﬀer (w,(q,w0))
with w < w. Hence, by (A1), V (h|σ) < αy + (1 − α)y − w if h is the initial history of the game.
Lemma 5 then implies that V (h0|σ) < αy+(1−α)y−w for every history h0 for the ﬁrm after which
it hires the available age 1 worker. The desired result now follows from Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 7: Suppose, by contradiction, that there is an equilibrium σ with a history b h
for the ﬁrm after which, despite not committed to do so, it oﬀers (w,(q,w0)), with q ≥ 0, to an
incumbent of age k ≥ 2 who has only produced low output and will never exert eﬀort. Denote this
worker by W and assume, without loss, that he is dismissed when he is of age k + q + 1 if he has
not revealed himself to be of the high type by then. Note that if σ is to be an equilibrium, then it
must be that: (i) w = w0 = w; (ii) the ﬁrm always oﬀers the lowest one–period wage possible to
W; (iii) the ﬁrm never pays W a bonus. Let φ < φ0 be W’s reputation, y(1,α) = αy + (1 − α)y,
and V < y(1,α) − w be the continuation payoﬀ to the ﬁrm after it hires an age 1 worker. Then,
34by Lemma 6, V (b h|σ) = V (φ), where
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f(1 − δf)[y − y] + δ
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from which it follows that V (φ) is strictly increasing in φ. Consider now the following deviation for
the ﬁrm after b h: oﬀer (w,(q,w)) to the available age 1 worker and then behave as if no deviation has
occurred—in particular, the ﬁrm treats this new worker as if he were W. The ﬁrm’s continuation
payoﬀ after this deviation is at least V (φ0)—at worst for the ﬁrm, the new worker never exerts
eﬀort. This implies the ﬁrm has a proﬁtable deviation, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider ﬁrst a worker of age k ∈ {2,...,T −1} who has only produced
low output. Denote this worker by W, let π < φ0 be his private belief that he is of the high type,
and suppose the ﬁrm employs him. We claim that W does not exert eﬀort and that the ﬁrm pays
W the one–period wage it oﬀers him. For this, let ` ≤ T −k+1 be the maximum number of periods
(including the present one) that W is employed if he never produces high output. We proceed by
induction in `.
(1) Suppose ` = 1, that is, W is dismissed after low output. In particular, the ﬁrm is not committed
to make W an oﬀer in the next period and does not oﬀer W commitment in the present period.
Then, by Lemmas 4 and 6, W’s incentive–compatibility constraint for eﬀort exertion is
−c + π(α + η)
n
v(wy) + δw(1 − δw)−1(1 − δT−k
w )v(w)
o
+[1 − π(α + η)]
n














35where wy is the wage the ﬁrm pays this worker after he produces y. By Corollary 1, wy = w, the
one–period wage the ﬁrm oﬀers W. Since ` = 1, wy = w as well. Hence, we can rewrite (13) as
πηδw(1 − δw)−1(1 − δT−k
w )[v(w) − v(w)] ≥ c,
which is not satisﬁed by assumption. Thus, W does not exert eﬀort.
(2) Suppose, by induction, that there exists `0 ≤ T − k + 1 such that if ` ≤ `0, then W does not
exert eﬀort and the ﬁrm pays W the one–period wage it oﬀers him. Now let ` = `0 + 1. We know




] + πηδw[R(y,e|π,k) − R(y,e|π,k)] + δw(1 − πα)[R(y,e|π,k) − R(y,e|π,k)] ≥ c,
(14)
where wy has the same interpretation as in Step 1 and R(y,e|π,k) is W’s continuation payoﬀ after
he chooses e and produces y, which depends on π and k.20
Lemma 7 and the induction hypothesis imply that the ﬁrm must be committed to employ W
for the next `0 periods. Let e w ≥ w be the lowest one–period wage the ﬁrm must oﬀer W during
this period of time. Then, by Lemmas 4 and 6,
R(y,e|π,k) = (1 − δw)−1(1 − δ`0
w)v(max{w, e w}) + δ`0
w(1 − δw)−1(1 − δT−k−`0
w )v(w).
Now let π(e) = [1 − ξ(e)]π/[1 − πξ(e)], where ξ(e) = α and ξ(e) = α + η. By the induction
hypothesis, W never exerts eﬀort after producing low output. So, the ﬁrm has no incentive to oﬀer
him more than e w as long as he does not produce high output. Using Lemmas 4 and 6 one more
time, we have that
R(s) = (1 − δw)−1(1 − δs+1
w )v(e w) + δs+1
w (1 − δw)−1(1 − δ`0−s
w )v(max{w, e w})
+δ`0
w(1 − δw)−1(1 − δT−k−`0
w )v(w)
is W’s continuation payoﬀ after producing low output (and receiving wy) if he produces high output
for the ﬁrst time after s ∈ {0,...,`0 − 1} periods, and
R(`0) = (1 − δw)−1(1 − δ`0
w)v(e w) + δ`0
w(1 − δw)−1(1 − δT−k−`0
w )v(w)
20We show below that R(y,e) does not depend on W’s reputation.
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(1 − α)sα[R(s) − R(`0)] + R(`0).
Notice that R(s) > R(`0) for all s ≤ `0 − 1. Since π(e) > π(e), we then have that R(y,e|π,k) >
R(y,e|π,k). Moreover, ∆0 ≤ 0 by Corollary 1. So, a necessary condition for (14) is
πηδw[R(y,e|π,k) − R(y,e|π,k)] ≥ c. (15)
Now observe that v(max{w, e w}) − v(e w) ≤ v(w) − v(w), and so
R(y,e|π,k) − R(y,e|π,k) < R(y,e|π,k) − R(`0) ≤ (1 − δw)−1(1 − δT−k
w )[v(w) − v(w)].
Thus, (15) cannot be satisﬁed by assumption. This implies that W does not exert eﬀort, and so
the ﬁrm has no incentive to set wy greater than the one–period wage it oﬀers W.
We can then conclude that an incumbent of age 2 or more who has only produced low output
never exerts eﬀort when employed and that if the ﬁrm employs such a worker, then it always pays
him the one–period wage it oﬀers. To ﬁnish, consider an age 1 worker. The same argument used
in Step 2 shows that he does not exert eﬀort if the ﬁrm oﬀers him probation. The desired result
now follows.
Proof of Proposition 2: In order to show that σ∗ is an equilibrium, we need to prove that: (a)
it is optimal for the ﬁrm to dismiss an incumbent who has never produced high output if it is not
committed to employ him; (b) if the ﬁrm is to make an oﬀer to the available age 1 worker, then it
is optimal for it to oﬀer (w,0). The following facts will be useful. First, V ∗ satisﬁes
V ∗ = (1 − δf)[y(φ0,α + η) − w] + φ0(α + η)
n
δf(1 − δT−1
f )[y(1,α) − w] + δT
f V ∗
o
+[1 − φ0(α + η)]δfV ∗, (16)
where y(φ,ξ) = φξy+(1−φξ)y. Second, y(φ0,α+η)−w < V ∗ < y(1,α)−w. Third, the reputation
of an incumbent who has never produced high output is at most φ = (1 − α)φ0/[1 − φ0α] < φ0.
37We start with (a). Consider an incumbent of age T who has never produced high output. If the
ﬁrm employs him, then its continuation payoﬀ is smaller than (1−δf)[y(φ,α+η)−w]+δfV ∗ < V ∗,
so that it is optimal for the ﬁrm to dismiss this worker if it can do so. Suppose now, by induction,
that the ﬁrm’s continuation payoﬀ when it employs an incumbent of age k + 1, with k ≥ 2, who
has never produced high output is smaller than V ∗. Consider then an incumbent of age k who
has never produced high output. By the induction hypothesis, if the ﬁrm employs him, then its
continuation payoﬀ is smaller than
V = (1 − δf)[y(φ,α + η) − w] + φ(α + η)
n
δf(1 − δT−k
f )[y(1,α) − w] + δT+1−k
f V ∗
o
+[1 − φ(α + η)]δfV ∗.
Since V ∗ < (1 − δ
q
f)[y(1,α) − w] + δ
q
fV ∗ < (1 − δT−1
f )[y(1,α) − w] + δT−1
f V ∗ for all q < T − 1, we
can then conclude that V < V ∗ by (16). Thus, by induction, the continuation payoﬀ to the ﬁrm
from employing an incumbent who has only produced low output is always smaller than V ∗, which
implies (a). It is easy to see that (b) follows immediately from this.
For the second part of the proof, consider an equilibrium σ where, with positive probability,
the ﬁrm retains an age 2 incumbent after he produces low output. We are done if we show that
the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ in any such equilibrium is strictly smaller than V ∗. By construction, there exists
q ≥ 2 such that with positive probability the ﬁrm retains an incumbent of age k ≥ 2 who has never
produced high output if, and only if, k ≤ q. Let V (q) be the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ in this case. At best for
the ﬁrm, a worker in σ exerts eﬀort as long as he does not reveal himself to be of the high type.
Suppose that this is the case. Then, V (q) satisﬁes the following recursion:
V (q) = φ0
q−1 X
j=0




f)[y − w] + δ
j
f(1 − δf)[y − w]+
δ
j+1
f (1 − δ
T−1−j
f )[y(1,α) − w] + δT
f V (q)
o









Notice that (17) also makes sense when q = 1, in which case it reduces to (16). Also notice that
(17) can be rewritten as V (q) = TqV (q), where Tq is a contraction (from R into R).
38Observe that for any q ≤ T − 1,
(1 − δ
q
f)[y − w] + δ
q
fV ∗
> (1 − δ
q




(1 − δf)[y − w] + δf(1 − δ
T−q−1






f[1 − φ0(α + η)]

(1 − δf)[y − w] + δfV ∗	




f)[y − w] + δ
q
f(1 − δf)[y − w] + δ
q+1
f (1 − δ
T−q−1
f )[y(1,α) − w] + δT
f V ∗
o









Now observe that φ0(1 − α − η)q + 1 − φ0 = (1 − α − η)q + (1 − φ0)[1 − (1 − α − η)q]. Hence,




















f)[y − w] + δ
q
f(1 − δf)[y − w]
+δ
q+1
f (1 − δ
T−q−1
f )[y(1,α) − w] + δT
f V ∗
o




















f)[y − w] + δ
q
f(1 − δf)[y − w]
+δ
q+1
f (1 − δ
T−q−1




where the ﬁrst inequality follows from (18). Therefore, TqV ∗ > Tq+1V ∗ for all q ≤ T − 1. Since
V ∗ = T1V ∗, we then have that V ∗ > TqV ∗ for all q ∈ {2,...,T}. Since (Tq)nV ∗ converges to V (q)
by the contraction mapping theorem, we can then conclude that V ∗ > V (q) for all q ∈ {2,...,T},
the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 9: Consider an incumbent of age k ∈ {2,...,T} who has only produced low
output and denote this worker by W. We proceed by induction in k.
(1) Suppose that k = T. It is immediate to see that W never exerts eﬀort when employed. This
implies that: (i) if the ﬁrm makes W an oﬀer, then it oﬀers him the lowest one–period wage possible;
(ii) the ﬁrm never pays W a bonus if it employs him.
(2) Suppose, by induction, that there exists k0 ≥ 3 such that if k ≥ k0, then (i) and (ii) hold and
39W does not exert eﬀort when employed. Let k = k0 − 1 and consider W’s incentive–compatibility


















where π ≤ φ is W’s private belief that he is of the high type, ξ is the probability that W produces
high output, wy is the wage the ﬁrm pays W if he produces y, and R(y,e|π,k) is W’s continuation
payoﬀ after he chooses e and produces y, expressed as a function of π and k. Notice that ξ is
independent of W’s (current) choice of eﬀort.





≥ (1 − δw)c. (20)
Notice that R(y,e|π,k) = R(y,e|π,k) if W is dismissed after low output. So, suppose the ﬁrm
makes W an oﬀer after he produces low output; let e w be the one–period wage the ﬁrm oﬀers. By
Lemma 8 and the induction hypothesis, the ﬁrm makes W an oﬀer if he produces low output one
more time only if it is committed to do so. Let q ∈ {0,...,T − k − 1} be the number of periods
the ﬁrm is committed to make W an oﬀer after he produces low output two times in a row and let
e w0 be the smallest one–period wage the ﬁrm is committed to oﬀer W during this period of time.
Moreover, let π0 = (1 − ξ)π/(1 − ξπ), ξ(e) = α, and ξ(e) = γ. Then, by Lemmas 4 and 6,
R(y,e|π,k) = v(e w)
+π0ξ(e)
n
δw(1 − δw)−1(1 − δq
w)v(max{e w0,w}) + δq+1
w (1 − δw)−1(1 − δT−k−q−1
w )v(w)
o
+π0(1 − ξ(e))R(q) +

1 − π0 + π0(1 − ξ(e))(1 − α)q
δw(1 − δw)−1(1 − δq
w)v(e w0)
+ δq+1











δw(1 − δw)−1(1 − δj+1
w )v(e w0) + δj+1
w (1 − δw)−1(1 − δq
w)v(max{e w0,w})
+ δq+1
w (1 − δw)−1(1 − δT−k−q−1
w )v(w)
o
40if q ≥ 1. Therefore,
R(y,e|π,k) − R(y,e|π,k) =
π0(γ − α)
n
δw(1 − δw)−1(1 − δq
w)v(max{e w0,w}) + δq+1




+π0(α − γ)(1 − α)q
n
δw(1 − δw)−1(1 − δq
w)v(e w0) + δq+1




Since v(max{e w0,w}) − v(e w0) ≤ v(w) − v(w) and
R(q) ≥ [1 − (1 − α)q]
n
δw(1 − δw)−1(1 − δq
w)v(e w0) + δq+1
w (1 − δw)−1(1 − δT−k−q−1
w )v(w)
o
for all q ∈ {0,...,T − k − 1}, we can then conclude that
R(y,e|π,k) − R(y,e|π,k) ≤ π0(γ − α)δw(1 − δw)−1(1 − δT−k−1
w )[v(w) − v(w)].
Thus, (20) cannot be satisﬁed by (A3), which implies that W does not exert eﬀort when k = k0−1.
Consequently, (i) and (ii) also hold when k = k0 − 1.
Proof of Proposition 3: We know from the main text that a proﬁle σ with a history b h for the
ﬁrm after which, even though not committed to do so, it oﬀers (w,(q,w0)) to an age 2 worker who
did not produce high output when of age 1 can be an equilibrium only if q = 0 and w = w. In
fact, if q > 0, then the following deviation by the ﬁrm is proﬁtable by Lemma 8: (i) oﬀer the age 2
worker (w,0); (ii) behave as if no deviation has occurred if the age 2 worker produces high output;
(iii) hire the available age 1 worker if the age 2 worker produces low output. It is immediate to see
that there is a proﬁtable deviation for the ﬁrm if q = 0 and w > w.
Let V = V (h|σ) for any history h for the ﬁrm after which it makes an oﬀer to an age 1 worker.
By (A2), V satisﬁes the following recursion,
V = (1 − δf)[y(φ0,α) − w] + φ0α
n
δf(1 − δf)[y(1,γ) − w] + δ2
f(1 − δT−2
















= (1 − δf)[y(φ0,α) − w] + δf(1 − δf)

φ0α[y(1,γ) − w] + (1 − φ0α)[y(φ,γ) − w]
	
+




f )[y(1,α) − w] + δT
f V
o
+ {1 − φ0[α + γ(1 − α)]}δ2
fV,
41from which we obtain
V = [y(1,α) − w] −
(1 − δf)∆ + δf(1 − δf){φ0α[y(1,α) − y(1,γ)] + (1 − φ0α)∆0}
1 − δ2




Now recall from the main text that the desired result holds if




[y(1,α) − w − V ]
for δf suﬃciently close to one. Since
lim
δf→1
V = A = [y(1,α) − w] −
∆ + φ0α[y(1,α) − y(1,γ)] + (1 − φ0α)∆0




e V = B = [y(φ,γ) − w] +
∆ + φ0α[y(1,α) − y(1,γ)] + (1 − φ0α)∆0
2 + φ0[α + γ(1 − α)](T − 2)
φγ(T − 2),
we are done if we show that
A − B = ∆0 −
1 + φγ(T − 2)
2 + φ0[α + γ(1 − α)](T − 2)

∆ − φ0α(γ − α)∆y + (1 − φ0α)∆0
> 0.
For this, notice that A > B if, and only if,
{2 + φ0[α + γ(1 − α)](T − 2)}∆0 > [1 + φγ(T − 2)]

∆ − φ0α(γ − α)∆y + (1 − φ0α)∆0
,
which reduces to
[1 + φ0α(T − 1)]∆0 − [1 + φγ(T − 2)][∆ − φ0α(γ − α)∆y] > 0.
Since ∆0 = ∆ + y(φ0,α) − y(φ,γ) = ∆ + (φ0α − φγ)∆y, we then have that A > B if, and only if,
φγ {[1 + φ0α(T − 1)]∆y + [∆ − φ0α(γ − α)∆y](T − 2)}
< φ0α{(T − 1)∆ + [1 + φ0α(T − 1)]∆y + (γ − α)∆y};




∆ + (γ − α)∆y + φ0α(γ − α)(T − 2)∆y
(T − 2)∆ + [1 + φ0α(T − 1)]∆y − φ0α(γ − α)∆y(T − 2)

,
which reduces to condition (5).
Proof of Lemma 11: Suppose not. So, there is a history for the ﬁrm after which it employs
a worker of age k ≥ 2 with an output history e yk that includes at least one high output and the
42worker, whom we denote by W, exerts eﬀort. Suppose the long–term contract the ﬁrm oﬀers W is
(ω,τ) and consider the deviation where the ﬁrm oﬀers him (ω0,τ) instead of (ω,τ), where the only
diﬀerence between ω and ω0 is that ω0
k+1(e yk,y) ≡ w0, with
v(w0) = (α + η)v(wk+1(e yk,y)) + (1 − α − η)v(wk+1(e yk,y)) − c.
Notice that w0 > w since W’s participation constraint after e yk must be satisﬁed. By construction,
a worker behaves under (ω0,τ) in the same as he behaves under (ω,τ), except that he does not
exert eﬀort after e yk—the fact that a worker knows he is of the high type after e yk is key for this.
So, this deviation changes ﬂow payoﬀs for the ﬁrm only after e yk. Before the deviation, the ﬂow
payoﬀ to the ﬁrm after e yk is
R = (1 − δf)
n
y(1,α) + η∆y − (α + η)wk+1(e yk,y) − (1 − α − η)wk+1(e yk,y)
o
= (1 − δf)
n
y(1,α) + η∆y − (α + η)v−1(v(wk+1(e yk,y))) − (1 − α − η)v−1(v(wk+1(e yk,y)))
o
≤ (1 − δf)
n
y(1,α) + η∆y − v−1
h
(α + η)v(wk+1(e yk,y)) + (1 − α − η)v(wk+1(e yk,y))
io
= (1 − δf)

y(1,α) + η∆y − v−1(v(w0) + c)
	
= (1 − δf)G(w0),
where the inequality follows from the fact that v−1 is convex. After the deviation, the ﬂow payoﬀ
to the ﬁrm after e yk is (1 − δf)r(w0,e). Now observe, by the inverse function theorem, that G is
diﬀerentiable and G0(w) = −v0(w)/v0(v−1(v(w) + c)).21 Since v−1 is strictly increasing and v0 is
weakly decreasing, we then have that G0(w) ≤ −1. So,
G(w0) − G(w) =
Z w0
w
G0(w)dw ≤ −(w0 − w) = r(w0,e) − r(w,e).
We can then conclude by (A4) that
R ≤ (1 − δf)G(w0) ≤ (1 − δf){G(w) + r(w0,e) − r(w,e)} < (1 − δf)r(w0,e),
which implies that the deviation under consideration is proﬁtable.
Proof of Proposition 5: We ﬁrst show that a worker who has only produced low output has the
greatest incentive to exert eﬀort when, all else the same, he is dismissed after low output.
21It is possible to show that the concavity of v implies that G is absolutely continuous on [w,w
0] with G
0(w), which
exists almost everywhere, less than or equal to −1 for almost all w ∈ [w,w
0]. So, the result of Lemma 11 does not
depend on the assumption that v is continuously diﬀerentiable. Details are available upon request.
43Consider such a worker, let k be his age, π ≤ φ0 be his private belief that he is of the high type,
and q be the number of consecutive times he can produce low output before he is dismissed; q = 0



















where wy is the wage the ﬁrm pays him if his output is y, and R(y,e|π,k,q) is his continuation
payoﬀ if he chooses e and produces y, which depends on π, k, and q. We want to show, holding
wy, wy, and the worker’s continuation payoﬀ after he produces high output constant, that if (21)
is satisﬁed for some q > 0, then it is also satisﬁed when q = 0.
First notice that R(y,e|π,k,q) does not depend on q and, as in the case without full commitment,
that R(y,e|π,k) = R(y,e|π,k). So, (21) reduces to
πη[v(wy) − v(wy)] + πηδw[R(y,e|π,k) − R(y,e|π,k,q)]
+δw(1 − πα)[R(y,e|π,k,q) − R(y,e|π,k,q)] ≥ c. (22)
Now notice that (22) reduces to
πη[v(wy) − v(wy)] + πηδw[R(y,e|π,k) − (1 − δw)−1(1 − δT−k−1
w )v(w)] ≥ c (23)
when q = 0. Hence, we are done if we show that the left–hand side of (23) is greater than the
left–hand side of (22) when q > 0.
Let q ≥ 1 and suppose the worker exerts eﬀort and produces low output. Now let ξs and R(s),
with s ∈ {0,...,q−1}, be the probability that he produces high output for the ﬁrst time after s+1
periods and his continuation payoﬀ in this event, respectively. Moreover, let ξq and R(q) be the
probability that the worker never produces high output in the next q periods and his continuation
payoﬀ in this event, respectively. To ﬁnish, recall that π(e) = (1−ξ(e))π/[1−πξ(e)], where ξ(e) = α




ξsR(s) + [1 − π(e) + π(e)ξq]R(q) = π(e)
q−1 X
s=0
ξs[R(s) − R(q)] + R(q).
44Now suppose the worker exerts no eﬀort and produces low output. Since after this he has the
option of behaving as if he exerted eﬀort and produced low output, we have that R(y,e|π,k,q) ≥
π(e)
Pq−1
s=0 ξs[R(s) − R(q)] + R(q). Therefore,


































The desired result follows from the fact that
Pq
s=0 ξsR(s) > (1 − δw)−1(1 − δT−k−1
w )v(w).
Suppose, by contradiction, that there is an equilibrium σ with a history b h for the ﬁrm after
which it oﬀers (ω,τ) with τ2(y) > 0 to the available age 1 worker. Denote this worker by W. We
consider the case where τ3(y,y) = 0. It is straightforward, but notationally cumbersome, to modify
the following argument to cover the case where there exists k > 3 such that τs(y,...,y) > 0 for all
3 ≤ s ≤ k − 1 and τk(y,...,y) = 0. Let Vyt be the ﬁrm’s continuation payoﬀ after W produces yt
and is paid ωt(yt). Moreover, let e1 be W’s age 1 eﬀort choice and e2 be W’s age 2 eﬀort choice if
he produces low output when of age 1 and receives an oﬀer by the ﬁrm. Then,
V (b h|σ) = ξ(e1)φ0 {(1 − δf)[y − ω1(y)] + δfVy}
+[1 − φ0ξ(e1)]
n
(1 − δf)[y − ω1(y)] + τ2(y)φξ(e2)δf
n
(1 − δf)[y − ω2(y,y)] + δfV(y,y)
o
+ τ2(y)[1 − φξ(e2)]δf
n
(1 − δf)[y − ω2(y,y)] + δfV (b h|σ)
o
+ [1 − τ2(y)]V (b h|σ)
o
,
where φ = [1 − ξ(e1)]φ0/[1 − φ0ξ(e1)], ξ(e) = γ, and ξ(e) = α.
Consider now the following deviation by the ﬁrm, where we only describe the instances in which
the ﬁrm does not behave according to σ. First, oﬀer (ω0,τ0) to W such that: (i) τ0
2(y) = 0; (ii)
τ0
t(yyt−2) = 1 for all yt−2 ∈ Y t−2 with 2 ≤ t ≤ T; (iii) ω0
1(y) = w, ω0
1(y) = ω1(y), and ω0
t ≡ ωt
45for all 2 ≤ t ≤ T if e1 = e; (iv) ω0
1 ≡ w and ω0
t(yyt−1) = w for all yt−1 ∈ Y t−1 with 2 ≤ t ≤ T if
e1 = e. Second, if W produces low output in his ﬁrst period of employment, then behave as if no
deviation has occurred with probability 1−τ2(y) and oﬀer (ω∗,τ∗) to the available age 1 worker with
probability τ2(y), where: (i) τ∗
2(y) = 0 and τ∗
2(y) = φ/φ0; (ii) τ∗
t (yyt−2) = 1 for all yt−2 ∈ Y t−2
with 3 ≤ t < T − 1 and τ∗
T ≡ 0; (iii) ω∗
1(y) = w, ω∗
1(y) = ω2(y,y), and ω∗
t(yt) = ωt+1(yyt) for
all yt ∈ Y t with 2 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 if e2 = e—ω∗
T is irrelevant since the worker who is oﬀered (ω∗,τ∗)
is never employed when he is of age T; (iv) ω∗
1 ≡ w and ω∗
t(yyt−1) = w for all yt−1 ∈ Y t−1 with
1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 if e2 = e.
Notice that W’s behavior when he is of age 1 is the same before and after the deviation. This
follows from the ﬁrst result we established in the proof if e1 = e and from (1) if e1 = e. Likewise,
an age 1 worker who is oﬀered (ω∗,τ∗) behaves in the same way as W behaves under σ after he
produces low output in his ﬁrst period of employment. So, if V ∗ denotes the ﬁrm’s continuation
payoﬀ after b h when it follows the deviation described above, then
V ∗ = ξ(e1)φ0

(1 − δf)[y − ω0





(1 − δf)[y − ω0
1(y)] + τ2(y)φ0ξ(e2)δf
n







+ τ2(y)[1 − φ0ξ(e2)]δf
n
(1 − δf)[y − ω∗
1(y)] + δfV (b h|σ)
o




y ≥ Vy and V ∗
(y,y) ≥ V(y,y) by construction. Since τ2(y)φ0[1 − τ∗
2(y)] = τ2(y)(φ0 − φ) and
φ0ξ(e2)y+(1−φ0ξ(e2))y > φξ(e2)y+(1−φξ(e2))y, we then have V ∗ > V (b h|σ), and so the deviation
described above is proﬁtable for the ﬁrm.
Proof of Lemma 11 in the non–IID case: Suppose not. So, there is a history for the ﬁrm
after which it employs a worker of age k ∈ {2,...,T − 1} with an output history e yk that includes
at least one high output and the worker, that we denote by W, exerts eﬀort. Let t be the period in
which this happens and suppose the long–term contract the ﬁrm oﬀers W is (ω,τ). Moreover, let
y1 denote W’s output in t, y2 denote W’s output in t+1 (in case he is employed by the ﬁrm), and
ξ be the probability that y1 = y. Consider now the deviation where the ﬁrm oﬀers W the contract
46(ω0,τ), where the only diﬀerence between ω and ω0 is that ω0








τk+2(e yk,y)[γv(wyy) + (1 − γ)v(wyy)] + [1 − τ2(e yk,y)]v(w)
o
− c = δwv(w0).
Notice that we must have τk+2(e yk,y) > 0 for at least one y ∈ Y in order for W to exert eﬀort after
e yk. Also notice, since W’s incentive–compatibility constraint for eﬀort is satisﬁed after e yk under
(ω,τ), that the left–hand side of the above equation is at least equal to
ξδw
n




τk+2(e yk,y)[αv(wyy) + (1 − α)v(wyy)] + [1 − τ2(e yk,y)]v(w)
o
.
So, limited liability implies that w0 > w. By construction, W’s behavior after the deviation only
changes after e yk, when he does not exert eﬀort. So, the (ﬂow) payoﬀs to the ﬁrm stay the same
except after e yky1, when they increase from (1−δf){y(1,α)+(γ −α)∆y −γwy1y −(1−γ)wy1y} to
(1 − δf)r(w,e) with probability τk+2(e yk,y1) by condition (A5).
Appendix B: Omitted Details
1. IID Case
Here we give an example of an equilibrium in the IID case where the ﬁrm oﬀers probation to age 1
workers. For this, let φ(e) = [1−ξ(e)]φ0/[1−φ0ξ(e)], where ξ(e) = α and ξ(e) = α+η. Then, φ(e)
is the reputation of an age 2 worker if he chooses e and produces low output in his ﬁrst period of
employment. Moreover, let φ = (1−α)2φ0/[(1−α)2φ0 +1−φ0] be the highest reputation possible
for an incumbent of age 3 or more who has never produced high output. Suppose then that
φ(e)(α + η) > 2φ0α, (24)
φ(e)ηδw(1 − δT−2
w )[v(w) − v(w)] > (1 − δw)c, (25)
max{φ,φ(e)}ηδw(1 − δT−2
w )[v(w) − v(w)] < (1 − δw)c, (26)
φ0ηδw[v(w) − v(w)] < c. (27)
47Notice that (24) is satisﬁed for all φ0 ∈ (0,1) if η(1 − α) > α(1 + α)—this condition reduces to
α < η/2 when α + η = 1—and that φ(e) < φ when α + η is close to one. Now observe that we
can choose T and v(w) − v(w) to be such that (25) to (27) are satisﬁed as long as the workers are
patient enough. For instance, let T be such that φ0 < φ(T −2) and then choose v(w)−v(w) to be
such that φη(T − 2)[v(w) − v(w)] = c.
Consider the strategy proﬁle σ∗∗ where: (i) the ﬁrm oﬀers (w,0) to an incumbent it knows is of
high ability; (ii) the ﬁrm oﬀers (w,(1,w)) to the available age 1 worker if it has no incumbent or if
its incumbent is of age 3 or more, has always produced low output, and the ﬁrm is not committed
to employ him; (iii) the ﬁrm oﬀers (w,0) to an age 2 incumbent who failed to produce high output
if it is not committed to make him an oﬀer; (iv) the ﬁrm oﬀers (w,0) to an incumbent if it is
committed to oﬀer him a one–period wage of at least w; (v) the ﬁrm always pays the one–period
wage it oﬀers; and (vi) the only worker who exerts eﬀort is an age 2 worker who, after not exerting
eﬀort and producing low output in his ﬁrst period of employment, receives an oﬀer of (w,0) by the
ﬁrm—observe that if the ﬁrm oﬀers (w,(1,w)) to an age 1 worker, then it oﬀers this worker (w,0)
after he produces low output. We claim that σ∗∗ is an equilibrium if the diﬀerence between the
left–hand side and the right–hand side of (25) is not too large and the ﬁrm is suﬃciently patient.
Proof: A straightforward modiﬁcation of the proof of Proposition 1 shows that: (a) if (26) is
satisﬁed, then a worker of age 3 or more who has always produced low output and an age 2 worker
who exerts eﬀort and produces low output when of age 1 do not exert eﬀort when employed; (b) if
the diﬀerence between the left–hand side and the right–hand side of (25) is small enough, then an
age 2 worker who does not exert eﬀort and produces low output when of age 1 only exerts eﬀort if
oﬀered (w,0) by the ﬁrm. So, in order to prove that (vi) is incentive–compatible, we only need to
show that an age 1 worker never exerts eﬀort. By (i) to (vi), an age 1 worker who is oﬀered (w,0)
and an age 1 worker who is oﬀered (w,(1,w)) have the same incentive–compatibility constraint for
48eﬀort exertion, which is given by
−(1 − δw)c + φ0(α + η)δw(1 − δT−1
w )v(w)
+[1 − φ0(α + η)]δw

(1 − δw)v(w) + φ(e)αδw(1 − δT−2
w )v(w) + [1 − φ(e)α]δw(1 − δT−2
w )v(w)
	
≥ φ0αδw(1 − δT−1
w )v(w) + (1 − φ0α)δw

(1 − δw)v(w) + φ(e)(α + η)δw(1 − δT−2
w )v(w)




It is possible, but tedious, to show that if (28) is not satisﬁed, then an age 1 worker has no incentive
to exert eﬀort regardless of the ﬁrm’s oﬀer. Intuitively, when instead of (w,(1,w)) the ﬁrm oﬀers
an age 1 (w,(q,w0)) with either q > 1 or w0 > w, it increases the worker’s continuation payoﬀ after
low output by more than it increases his continuation payoﬀ after high output. Now notice that
(28) can be rewritten as
−(1 − δw)c + φ0(α + η)δw(1 − δw)v(w) + [1 − φ0(α + η)]δw(1 − δw)v(w)
+φ0[α + (1 − α)(α + η)]δ2
w(1 − δT−2
w )v(w) + {1 − φ0[α + (1 − α)(α + η)]}δ2
w(1 − δT−2
w )v(w)
≥ φ0αδw(1 − δw)v(w) + (1 − φ0α)δw(1 − δw)v(w)
+φ0[α + (1 − α)(α + η)]δ2
w(1 − δT−2
w )v(w) + {1 − φ0[α + (1 − α)(α + η)]}δ2
w(1 − δT−2
w )v(w),
which cannot be satisﬁed by (27). Thus, (vi) is indeed incentive–compatible.
Suppose the ﬁrm has an incumbent of age 3 or more who has always produced low output and
is not committed to make him an oﬀer. We know by Lemma 7 that σ∗∗ can only be an equilibrium
if the ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to the available age 1 worker. By construction, the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between oﬀering (w,0) and (w,(1,w)) to this worker. By (vi), any other oﬀer by the ﬁrm does not
lead to a higher continuation payoﬀ. So, the only thing left to prove is that the decision in (iii)
is incentive–compatible for the ﬁrm. For this, let V denote the ﬁrm’s continuation payoﬀ after it
oﬀers an age 1 worker (w,(1,w)) and let V 0 denote the ﬁrm’s continuation payoﬀ after is oﬀers
(w,0) to an age 2 worker who produces low output when of age 1. We are done if we show that
V 0 > V . The same argument used in the proof of Proposition 3 shows that
V = y(1,α) − w −
(1 − δf)∆ + δf(1 − δf)(1 − φ0α)∆0
1 − δ2




49where ∆ = y(1,α) − w − [y(φ0,α) − w] and ∆0 = y(1,α) − w − [y(φ(e),α + η) − w]. Notice that
(24) implies that ∆ > ∆0. Now observe, again mimicking the steps of Proposition 3, that
V 0 = (1 − δf)[y(φ(e),α + η)] + φ(e)(α + η)δf(1 − δT−2
f )[y(1,α) − w − V ] + δfV.
Then, V 0 > V if, and only if,
(





(1 − δf)∆ + δf(1 − δf)(1 − φ0α)∆0
1 − δ2




When δf = 1, the above equation reduces to
1 + φ(e)(α + η)(T − 2)
2 + φ0[α + (1 − α)(α + η)](T − 2)
[∆ + (1 − φ0α)∆0] > ∆0,
which, after some rearrangements, can be rewritten as
[1 + φ(e)(α + η)(T − 2)]∆ > [1 + φ0α + φ0α(T − 2)]∆0.
Because ∆ > ∆0, the last inequality is satisﬁed if
φ(e)(α + η)(T − 2) > φ0α + φ0α(T − 2) ⇐⇒ (T − 2){φ(e)(α + η) − φ0α} > φ0α,
which is true by (24) and the fact that T ≥ 3 by assumption.
2. Non–IID Case
First notice that since ψ = (φ0α − φγ)∆y/∆ = α2φ0(1 − φ0)∆y/(1 − φ0α)∆, condition (9) can be
rewritten as
(1 − α)γ > α











Since ∆ ≤ α(1 − φ0)∆y, a necessary condition for (29) to be satisﬁed is that α < 1/2. When T is
large, (29) reduces to
(1 − α)γ > α







(1 − α)γ < α

1 − φ0α +
(1 − φ0α)φ0α(γ − α)∆y
∆ + φ0α[1 − (γ − α)]∆y

. (31)
50It is immediate to see that the largest γ is, the easiest is for (30) to be satisﬁed—an increase in
γ increases the value to the ﬁrm from inducing an age 1 worker to exert eﬀort. We know from
Subsection 6.1, however, that increasing γ makes it more diﬃcult for (31) to be satisﬁed. In fact,
when γ = 1, (31) can only be satisﬁed if α > 1/2. This follows from the fact that ∆ < α(1−φ0)∆y,
and so, when γ = 1, a necessary condition for (31) is that
(1 − α) <
α(1 − φ0α)
1 − φ0 + φ0α
⇐⇒ (1 − α)(1 − φ0) < α(1 − φ0).
Thus, we need γ < 1 if (30) and (31) are to be jointly satisﬁed. Let γ = κα and consider the case
where ∆w is small, so that ∆ is close to α(1 − φ0)∆y. When ∆ = α(1 − φ0)∆y, the condition that
(30) and (31) are jointly satisﬁed reduces to
1 < (1 − α)κ <
(1 − φ0α)




Hence, we need κ ∈ (1/(1 − α),2) for (32) to hold—notice that 1/(1 − α) < 2 is only possible if
α < 1/2 and that κ < 2 is equivalent to γ < 1 when α < 1/2. Now observe that g0(φ0) ∝ (κ−2)α.
So, a necessary condition for (32) to be satisﬁed is that
(1 − α)κ <
1 − α2
1 − α2(κ − 1)
⇐⇒ qκ(α) = α2κ(κ − 1) + α + κ + 1 > 0.
Since the discriminant of qκ is
p
1 − 4κ(κ + 1)(κ − 1), either qκ has no real roots, in which case qκ
is always positive (since qκ(0) > 0), or qκ has two negative roots, in which case qκ is positive in the
interval (0,1/2). So, for every κ ∈ (1/(1−α),2), there exists φ∗ < α such that if φ0 ∈ (φ∗,α), then
(32) is satisﬁed. Notice that φ0 close to α is only possible when ∆w is small, for otherwise (A1) is
violated.
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